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EXPLAINING STATE COMMITMENT TO  
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
STRONG ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AS  
A CREDIBLE THREAT 
YVONNE M. DUTTON

 
INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the International Criminal Court (―ICC‖) on July 1, 
2002 was a remarkable event for many reasons. The existence of the court 
is the result of a journey that commenced with the Nuremberg trials after 
the conclusion of World War II. In the ensuing period, nations searched 
for ways to ensure that states and individuals protect against, and are 
deterred from committing, human rights abuses. The idea of a permanent 
international criminal court dates from at least 1948, when the Genocide 
Convention referenced the possibility of individuals being tried by ―such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.‖1 Shortly thereafter, 
the International Law Commission (―ILC‖) was tasked with preparing 
draft statutes for such a permanent court.
2
 However, the Cold War 
intervened, and it was not until another four decades had passed that the 
global community again took up the idea of an international criminal 
court.
3
  
But even after the idea of a permanent ICC became a reality, the 1994 
ILC draft statute envisaged an institution that would allow states to guard 
much of their sovereignty. For example, regarding the court’s jurisdiction, 
the 1994 ILC draft provided that by virtue of ratifying the statute creating 
the court, states would confer upon the court automatic jurisdiction over 
only the crime of genocide.
4
 For other crimes, such as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, all states that could otherwise assert jurisdiction 
 
 
  Faculty, University of San Diego School of Law; J.D. Columbia University School of Law; 
Ph.D., Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder (2011). I thank the University of San 
Diego School of Law Faculty Summer Grant Program and the One Earth Future Foundation for 
providing financial support for this project. 
 1. Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of Genocide art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277.  
 2. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 323 (2d ed. 2008).  
 3. Id. at 323–28.  
 4. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 46th Sess, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/5509; U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 43 (1994) [hereinafter ―1994 ILC Draft‖].  
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over the matter (for example, the state where the acts were committed or 
the state with custody over the accused) would have to consent to 
conferring jurisdiction upon the court.
5
 As to the initiation of 
investigations and prosecutions, only states or the Security Council—as 
opposed to an independent prosecutor—could commence proceedings.6 
Finally, according to the 1994 ILC Draft, any permanent member of the 
Security Council would be able to use its veto power to prevent the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction over a matter since no prosecution could be 
commenced without Security Council approval.
7
 
Even though these measures drew support from many major powers, 
the majority of states rejected this conservative institutional design that 
preserved state autonomy and sovereignty and instead opted to create an 
entirely new type of international human rights institution. In the Rome 
Statute, which was adopted in July 1998, states agreed to create an ICC 
with a strong and independent prosecutor and a court with significant and 
legally binding enforcement powers. These measures were designed to 
encourage state compliance with the goal of ending impunity for 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.
8
 By committing to the treaty creating the ICC, 
states grant the court automatic jurisdiction over those core crimes.
9
 
Moreover, states agree that an independent ICC prosecutor may initiate 
investigations against their nationals for the covered crimes on his own 
with the approval of the court, or based on referrals from a State Party or 
the United Nations Security Council.
10
 The prosecutor and court operate 
without direct United Nations Security Council oversight, with the 
Council having no veto power over what situations are investigated or 
 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. arts. 23, 25.  
 7. Adriaan Bos, From the International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994–1998), 
in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME I 49–
50 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones, eds., 2002).  
 8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 91 
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. At the present time, the crimes over which the ICC does have 
jurisdiction are genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Id. art. 5. The parties to the Rome 
Statute also declared that the ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision 
is adopted defining that crime and setting out the conditions under which the court can exercise 
jurisdiction over it. Id. arts. 5(2). The parties agreed on that definition at the 2010 Rome Statute 
Review Conference in Kampala. However, the ICC will not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression until after January 1, 2017, and after the parties vote to amend the Rome Statute 
accordingly. See Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, 13th plenary meeting, June 11, 2010, I.C.C. Doc. 
RC/Res. 6, Annex 1, ¶¶ 2, 3(3), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-
Res.6-ENG.pdf. 
 9. Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2).  
 10. Id. arts. 13–15.  
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prosecuted.
11
 In addition, the treaty does not recognize any immunity 
states may otherwise grant to heads of state who engage in criminal 
activity.
12
  
Finally, although the ―complementarity‖ provision of the Rome Statute 
allows the ICC to operate as a court of last resort, the ICC can obtain 
jurisdiction over the nationals of States Parties when the state is ―unwilling 
or unable genuinely‖ to proceed with a case.13 ―Unwillingness‖ includes 
instances where national proceedings are a sham or are inconsistent with 
an intention to bring the person to justice, either because such proceedings 
are unjustifiably delayed or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially.
14
 The idea behind including the ―unwillingness‖ provision was 
to preclude the possibility of sham prosecutions aimed at shielding 
perpetrators due to, for example, government participation in, or 
complicity with, the offense.
15
 A nation’s ―inability‖ to prosecute includes 
instances where, because of the collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the nation cannot obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence, or is otherwise unable to carry out the proceedings.
16
 It bears 
noting that the ICC—not States Parties—determines whether the 
―unwilling or unable‖ bases for proceeding before the ICC have been met.  
Why would states commit
17
 to an institution like the ICC given that 
commitment can have such profound effects on their sovereign right to 
mete out justice within their own borders? It is true that the ICC treaty is 
not the first treaty which purports to bind states to protect individuals 
against human rights abuses occurring within the state’s own territory. It is 
also true that states regularly commit to such international human rights 
treaties.
18
 But, as many scholars have noted, those treaties typically 
 
 
 11. See Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and The Security Council: Articles 13(b) 
and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 143–52 (Roy 
S. Lee, ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE]; Jack Goldsmith & Stephen J. 
Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS 47, 55 (2003); Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an 
Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG. 655, 679–80 (2001) 
(explaining that while the Security Council members do not have a veto power, a unanimous Security 
Council vote may defer a prosecution). 
 12. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 27.  
 13. Id. pmbl., art. 17(1)(a). 
 14. Id. art. 17(2).  
 15. John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, 
supra note 11, at 50.  
 16. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(3). 
 17. When I refer to a country’s ―commitment‖ to an international human rights treaty or its 
decision to ―join‖ an international human rights treaty, I mean its decision to ratify the treaty.  
 18. The binding international treaties which are the foundation of this regime are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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contain weak enforcement mechanisms that pose little risk for the state 
that fails to comply with treaty terms.
19
 Thus, states can join them almost 
indiscriminately and without any intention of complying.
20
 In the case of 
the ICC, however, states run the risk that the ICC prosecutor will choose 
to investigate the state’s own citizens and require those citizens to stand 
trial at an international criminal court situated in The Hague. Accordingly, 
while it may be reasonable for states to commit to treaties with weak 
enforcement mechanisms, the fact that more than 100 states have now 
committed to the ICC and its strong enforcement mechanisms poses a 
puzzle.  
 
 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], both of which were opened for signature and ratification in 1966 
and came into force in 1976. Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 703, 705 (1997). Additional binding international 
human rights treaties followed, and the regime now boasts six primary treaties, to which the great 
majority of states have committed. The additional four treaties are the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter 
CERD]; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
Treaty texts and information about their status is on file with the Secretary General of the United 
Nations at the United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org.  
 19. For example, most treaties require only that states self-report compliance and the measures 
they have undertaken to give effect to the matters addressed in the Covenant. See ICCPR, supra note 
18, art. 40; ICESCR, supra note 18, arts. 16, 17; CERD, supra note 18, art. 9; CEDAW, supra note 18, 
arts. 18, 21; CAT, supra note 18, art. 19; CRC, supra note 18, art. 44. Even the additional opt-in 
enforcement mechanisms available under some of the treaties—whereby states agree to accept state or 
individual complaints alleging noncompliance—are far from strong. For example, under Articles 21 
and 22 of the CAT, states recognize the competence of the Committee Against Torture to hear 
complaints by states and individuals, respectively. See CAT, supra note 18, arts. 21, 22. Under Article 
41 of the ICCPR, states may agree to recognize the competence of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee to consider complaints of one state against another claiming the party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under the treaty. However, the committees’ enforcement mechanisms are limited to 
attempting to facilitate a resolution or providing a report of findings. See CAT, supra note 18, arts. 21, 
22(7); ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 42. Accordingly, states may view commitment to international 
human rights treaties as essentially costless from a sovereignty standpoint simply because the treaty 
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are weak. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of 
Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1838–40 (2003). 
 20. See, e.g., Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, supra note 19, at 1856–57 (finding that non-
democratic nations with poor human rights ratings were just as likely, and sometimes even more 
likely, to commit to international human rights treaties than non-democratic nations with better human 
rights ratings); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 
1935, 1982–87 (2002) (showing, for example, that approximately the same percentage of countries 
with the most recorded acts of torture ratified the CAT as did countries with no recorded acts of 
torture); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The 
Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1374 (2005) (noting that the average state has 
ratified a steadily increasing number of human rights treaties, but that the percentage of states 
reportedly repressing human rights has grown over time, suggesting that states may ratify only as 
window dressing). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/3
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That more than 100 states have ratified the ICC treaty is puzzling 
because states typically guard their sovereignty and are reluctant to join 
international treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms, particularly if 
they cannot comply with treaty terms.
21
 Can we expect that the more than 
100 states that have ratified the ICC will abide by treaty terms and protect 
against human rights abuses and/or domestically prosecute any of their 
citizens who perpetrate mass atrocities? Does the fact that these states 
willingly committed to an international human rights treaty with relatively 
strong enforcement mechanisms mean that they are also committed to the 
goal of ending impunity for perpetrators of mass atrocities? After all, the 
intent of strong enforcement mechanisms must be to enforce compliance 
with treaty terms—in this case by ensuring that perpetrators of mass 
atrocities are brought to justice and other potential perpetrators are 
deterred as a result.  
On the other hand, approximately ninety nations are still not parties to 
the ICC treaty, and some states have ratified less swiftly than others.
22
 
Why did these states fail to ratify the Rome Statute or ratify more slowly 
than others? Given the treaty’s relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, 
should we expect that states with the worst human rights practices are 
among the states that have not ratified? After all, for these states, joining 
international human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms 
may be in their rational self-interest, but joining the ICC may not be. But 
if the majority of states joining the court are those that already have the 
best human rights practices, can the ICC really have a significant impact 
on improving universal respect for human rights and deterring mass 
atrocities?  
This Article explores and seeks to understand the puzzle of state 
commitment to the ICC. It uses a research design that is unique in 
empirically examining whether and how the apparently strong 
enforcement mechanisms associated with the treaty creating the court 
might influence state commitment decisions.
23
 By exploring the puzzle of 
 
 
 21. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 437 (2000) (suggesting that the sovereignty costs of committing to international 
institutions providing for centralized decision-making are highest where an issue touches on the 
hallmarks of Westphalian sovereignty, such as the state’s relation to its citizens and territory).  
 22. See infra Appendix A. 
 23. Few other studies have empirically examined the question of state commitment to the ICC, 
and the few studies that have examined the question all posit different theories, employ different 
dependent variables in different empirical models, and reach different conclusions about what 
variables are and are not driving ICC state behavior. See Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, 
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 240–46 (2010) 
(arguing that non-democracies with recent civil wars are most likely to commit to the ICC because 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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state commitment to the ICC, this Article hopes to shed some light on why 
states joined or refused to join that institution. In addition, it seeks to 
contribute to our understanding of how institutional design—and 
enforcement mechanisms in particular—affects state commitment and 
compliance in the context of the international human rights regime more 
broadly. Understanding commitment and why states refuse to commit is 
important for evaluating the role of international treaties and state 
ratification of those treaties in bettering state human rights practices and 
ending impunity for those who abuse individual human rights.  
Building on existing scholarship,
24
 this Article theorizes that 
commitment to international human rights treaties is a function of two 
considerations relative to the costs of noncompliance: (1) the institutional 
design of the treaty—specifically, the level of enforcement mechanisms to 
punish noncompliance; and (2) the state’s domestic political 
characteristics relating to its ability to comply with treaty terms. If states 
view the enforcement mechanisms associated with the ICC treaty as strong 
enough to pose a credible threat to their sovereignty, they should only 
commit if they are able to comply with treaty terms. First and foremost, 
compliance with ICC treaty terms requires that the state have good human 
rights practices since the state can best avoid the specter of an ICC 
prosecution if its leaders and citizens do not commit the kinds of mass 
atrocities within the court’s jurisdictional purview. As a secondary matter, 
states can also comply with ICC treaty terms and avoid having their 
citizens tried in The Hague if they have independent domestic law 
enforcement institutions that are also capable of prosecuting any human 
rights violations within their own states.  
 
 
they want to tie their own hands and limit their ability to commit mass atrocities); Jay Goodliffe & 
Darren Hawkins, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal 
Court Negotiations, 71 J. OF POL. 977 (2009) (arguing that a state’s dependence networks are a 
primary influence on ICC commitment); Judith Kelley, Who Keeps International Commitments and 
Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements, 101 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 573 (2007) (testing ICC commitment preliminary to the study’s main focus on determining why 
states that joined the ICC would also sign or refuse to sign bilateral immunity agreements with the 
United States).  
 24. Oona Hathaway is generally credited with first examining empirically the relationship 
between state human rights practices and their tendency to enter into international human rights 
treaties. However, in her 2003 study, the only variables she used to test treaty commitment to several 
human rights treaties were a state’s human rights ratings and whether or not it was a democracy—
without accounting for the timing of ratifications. Although she acknowledged that other variables 
may influence commitment, she purposely limited her study. See Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 
supra note 19, at 1849. In a later study, Hathaway included some additional variables testing 
commitment to several human rights treaties using a Cox proportional hazards model, though her study 
did not include the ICC. See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights 
Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588 (2007).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/3
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As such, good human rights practices and independent and capable 
domestic law enforcement institutions are each individually sufficient for 
states to conclude that ratifying the ICC treaty will not be overly costly. 
Thus, if a country has either good human rights practices or independent 
and capable domestic law enforcement institutions, it should conclude that 
ICC ratification is relatively costless and should commit to the court. In 
addition, for a state to conclude that ratification of the ICC is essentially 
costless because the state can comply with treaty terms, either good human 
rights practices or independent and capable domestic law enforcement 
institutions are a necessary condition to ratification. However, because the 
ICC is able to scrutinize whether member states’ domestic prosecutions 
are adequate to ward off an ICC investigation, this Article suggests that 
good human rights practices become an almost necessary condition to 
ratification. Indeed, states concerned about compliance costs may not want 
to rely only on their own assessment of the independence and capability of 
their domestic institutions and would be wise to insure that their human 
rights practices are sufficiently good before committing to the court. On 
the other hand, a state with weak domestic institutions could nevertheless 
conclude that commitment to the ICC treaty would be relatively costless as 
long as the state’s human rights practices are good. Of course, even states 
that meet these conditions may decline to commit to the ICC for other 
reasons.  
Accordingly, I predict that states with better human rights practices and 
independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions will view 
the costs of complying with the ICC treaty’s terms as relatively minimal 
and more readily commit to the court.
25
 In fact, because the primary way 
 
 
 25. Of course, one might ask what benefits a state might obtain from joining an international 
organization that exists only to promote better human rights practices and domestic institutions. 
Although my theory posits that a state considering ICC commitment will be most concerned with the 
costs of compliance and a potential loss of sovereignty, the state will still likely wish to receive some 
benefits from commitment. I can imagine several benefits even states with already good human rights 
practices and domestic law enforcement institutions might believe they would obtain from joining the 
ICC (all of which are likely extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify). For example, states 
with better human rights practices likely believe the norm of protecting human rights is worth 
spreading to the rest of the world. Thus, there may be some moral benefit to supporting an 
organization with a mission to improve global human rights practices. Furthermore, a state with good 
practices may conclude that an organization like the ICC has the potential via its enforcement 
mechanism to deter future mass atrocities—atrocities which presumably can produce negative 
consequences beyond the state in which they are occurring—by, for example, disrupting trade patterns 
and inhibiting production of goods or the extraction of resources. In addition, where mass atrocities 
occur, other states are often called upon to provide peacekeeping forces or foreign aid, goods, services, 
and housing to the innocent victims of such atrocities. To the extent such atrocities are deterred by the 
ICC, all of these negative consequences can be mitigated, thereby creating a potential benefit to the 
states that otherwise ―pay‖ in some sense for those consequences. In any event, a state may conclude 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in which states can avoid an ICC investigation and prosecution is by 
having relatively good human rights practices, even with weak domestic 
law enforcement institutions, those states should conclude that the costs of 
ICC commitment will be relatively minimal. States with poor human 
rights practices and biased or incapable domestic law enforcement 
institutions, however, should view commitment to the ICC treaty as 
costly—even if previous studies suggest they regularly commit to other 
international human rights treaties. Indeed, even with independent and 
capable institutions (and there may be few states with such characteristics, 
in any event), a state with poor human rights practices may view the costs 
of compliance as being so significantly high that it will refuse to commit 
to the court.  
The results of event history analysis from 1998 to 2008 provide support 
for the idea that states view the ICC’s enforcement mechanisms as a 
credible threat and more readily join the court when their retrospective 
calculations about their ability to comply with treaty terms indicates that 
commitment will not impose significant sovereignty costs. Specifically, 
the results indicate that states with a past record of better human rights 
practices are more likely than states with poor human rights practices to 
commit to the court. In addition, although the evidence is less conclusive 
about the role domestic law enforcement institutions play in state 
ratification decisions, there is evidence showing that democracies are more 
likely to commit to the court—even the relatively few democracies with 
poorer human rights practices. This finding provides support for the idea 
that states that already have checks on government power, such as through 
independent judicial institutions, view commitment to the ICC as less 
costly. Thus, these states have less to fear from the additional threat of an 
ICC prosecution since they should expect that they or their citizens would 
be prosecuted domestically in any event if they committed the kinds of 
mass atrocities within the ICC’s jurisdiction.  
Although these results necessarily show that ICC member states tend to 
have relatively good human rights practices, this does not imply that the 
ICC and its relatively strong enforcement mechanisms will play no role in 
improving human rights practices or insuring that perpetrators of mass 
atrocities are punished. First, because of the ICC’s relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms, even states with better human rights practices 
 
 
that there is some deterrence value—and no harm to itself in the sovereignty sense—in having in place 
an organization that can prosecute the citizens of other states for mass atrocities. Some other potential 
―benefits‖ that all states might obtain by ICC commitment are discussed under the ―Normative View‖ 
section, infra, and their influence is tested in the empirical models. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/3
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should have reason to insure their practices remain good or improve so as 
to avoid running afoul of treaty terms. Second, the ICC’s jurisdictional 
reach extends beyond States Parties since the United Nations Security 
Council is able to refer cases to the court
26—as it has done with both the 
Sudan
27
 and, recently, Libya.
28
 Thus, the existence of the ICC and its 
independent prosecutor and court should stand as a warning to all states 
that human rights abuses will not be tolerated, and will instead be 
punished. Finally, the evidence shows that some states with poor practices 
do commit to the court. Those states will have to improve their poor 
human rights practices or risk a costly loss of sovereignty since the ICC 
has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms to punish noncompliant 
behavior.  
In short, because the evidence suggests that states are taking seriously 
the threat associated with the ICC’s enforcement mechanisms, the 
implication is that stronger enforcement mechanisms may actually entice 
states to comply with treaty terms and respect human rights—rather than 
commit for the purposes of window dressing only and with no regard for 
compliance. Such a trend would be promising, even for states with 
―better‖ human rights practices.  
This Article is organized into six parts. Part I provides a brief history of 
the ICC and discusses the institutional design of the treaty creating the 
court. Part II reviews the existing literature on commitment to 
international human rights treaties. I group that literature under two broad 
categories which this Article labels (1) ―the rationalist view‖ and (2) ―the 
normative view.‖ In Part III, this Article presents more fully a theory 
regarding the credible threat associated with stronger enforcement 
mechanisms and how that threat influences treaty commitment. In Part IV, 
this Article describes the research design of the empirical analysis.  
Part V presents the results of the empirical tests. It begins by 
comparing the ratification patterns of states with high and low values on 
the two main explanatory variables: (1) level of human rights practices and 
(2) quality of domestic law enforcement institutions. It then discusses the 
results of the quantitative tests which were conducted using event history 
 
 
 26. Rome Statute, arts. 12, 13(b).  
 27. Press Release, Secretary-General Welcomes Adoption of Security Council Resolution 
Referring Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to International Criminal Court Prosecutor, U.N. Press Release 
SG/SM/9797AFR/1132 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ 
sgsm9797.doc.htm. 
 28. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities 
in Bid to Stem Violent Repression (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. 
asp?NewsID=37633&C. 
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analysis and employing a number of control variables suggested by the 
existing literature. The Article’s conclusion suggests how to structure 
international treaties so that states perceive them as credible threats to 
punish bad and noncompliant behavior.  
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICC 
Situated in The Hague, Netherlands, the ICC is the first permanent, 
treaty-based international criminal court established to help end impunity 
for perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
29
 
Although the United Nations first began considering the prospect of an 
international criminal court after World War II, it was not until 1990, 
following a request submitted by Trinidad and Tobago,
30
 that work again 
commenced in earnest towards drafting a statute for the creation of such a 
court. The United Nations General Assembly tasked the ILC with drafting 
a statute for the establishment of an international criminal court.
31
 In July 
1994, an ILC draft statute was adopted and recommended to the General 
Assembly.
32
 The General Assembly thereafter adopted a resolution to 
establish an Ad Hoc Committee to address the core issue of the viability of 
actually creating an international criminal court, and in light of that issue, 
the possibility of convening a diplomatic conference of states. A 
Preparatory Committee (―Prep Comm‖) took over with the objective of 
negotiating the precise statutory language governing the court and its 
functions. The Prep Comm met in 1996, 1997, and 1998. The draft statute 
approved during the April 1998 Prep Comm meeting—which contained 
116 articles, many of which included bracketed optional provisions—
formed the basis of negotiations at the Rome Conference during the 
summer of 1998.
33
 
The statute creating the court—the Rome Statute—was finally adopted 
at the conclusion of the Rome Conference.
34
 Attending the conference 
were 160 states, 33 international governmental coalitions, and a coalition 
 
 
 29. Rome Statute, supra note 8, pmbl. 
 30. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the Secretary-General, 
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex 44, Agenda Item 152, U.N. Doc. A/44/195 (Aug. 21, 1989).  
 31. G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 311, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 4, 
1989).  
 32. See 1994 ILC Draft, supra note 4, at 44.  
 33. Preparatory Committee Draft Statute, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.2 (Apr. 14, 1998); see 
also THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 7, at 68. 
 34. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 23 (1999). 
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of more than 200 non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
35
 Of the states 
in attendance, 120 voted in favor of adopting the statute, 7 voted against, 
and 21 abstained.
36
 In July 2002 after the required 60 states had ratified the 
statute, the ICC came into existence.
37
 
As of August 2010, some 139 countries had signed the Rome Statute, 
and 113 had actually become States Parties to it.
38
 Of the States Parties, 20 
are from Western Europe, 17 are from Eastern Europe, 31 are from Africa, 
14 are from Asia, and 25 are from Latin America and the Caribbean.
39
 The 
United States, Israel, China, Russia, Indonesia, and India are notable 
powerful states that have declined to ratify the treaty. Also not parties to 
the treaty are a number of Islamic and African states, including: Bahrain, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen, Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Morocco, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In June 2010, Bangladesh became the 
first country from southern Asia to join the court.
40
 
The adoption of the Rome Statute—particularly in its current form—
was anything but a foregone conclusion. Indeed, a handful of core issues 
concerning ICC jurisdiction over crimes, the mechanism for triggering 
prosecution, and the role of the United Nations Security Council were the 
subject of much negotiation.
41
 Although a number of states favored an 
independent prosecutor with power to initiate proceedings and no Security 
Council veto on prosecutions, some powerful states, such as the United 
States, pushed for granting the Security Council a greater role in 
determining which cases to pursue.
42
 Nevertheless, at the conclusion of 
negotiations, the Rome Statute states voted to adopt was one that 
envisioned a powerful and independent court. 
Indeed, the ICC that these states joined differs substantially from any 
preceding international criminal tribunal. Unlike the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals such as those established to deal with crimes committed 
 
 
 35. See Caroline Fehl, Explaining the International Criminal Court: A ‘Practice Test’ for 
Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 357, 362 (2004).  
 36. See Arsanjani, supra note 34. 
 37. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT (2007). 
 38. For a list of state parties to the ICC, see http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en.  
 39. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (―CICC‖), States Parties to the 
International Criminal Court, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RATIFICATIONSby 
Region_18_August2010_eng.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See SCHABAS, supra note 37.  
 42. Id.  
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in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the ICC’s jurisdiction is not 
circumscribed to dealing with particular atrocities in particular states.
43
 
Nor can states decide whether or not to accede to the court’s jurisdiction 
on a case-by-case basis.
44
 Rather, by committing to the treaty creating the 
ICC, states agree that investigations may be commenced against the state’s 
own nationals for the covered crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes, as long as those crimes were committed after the 
court came into existence or after the state ratified the treaty, whichever is 
later.
45
 Furthermore, the ICC treaty is not only backward-looking; by 
joining the court, states agree that the court can prosecute any future 
atrocities in the event the state itself does not prosecute those atrocities 
domestically. Moreover, the treaty does not recognize any immunity that 
states may otherwise grant to heads of state who engage in criminal 
activities.
46
  
The treaty creating the ICC also has stronger enforcement mechanisms 
than those traditionally associated with international human rights treaties. 
According to the terms and provisions of the Rome Statute, an 
independent ICC prosecutor may initiate investigations against nationals 
of States Parties for the covered crimes on his own with the approval of 
the court, or based on referrals from a State Party or the United Nations 
Security Council.
47
 The prosecutor and the court operate without direct 
Security Council oversight, with the Council having no veto power over 
what situations are investigated or prosecuted.
48
 Not only have States 
Parties to the ICC delegated authority to independent decision makers, but 
they have also given those decision makers power to enforce those 
decisions. Most importantly, the ICC is empowered to issue arrest 
 
 
 43. For example, in 1993, the United Nations established the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) to preside over trials against 
those who had committed atrocities and crimes against humanity during armed conflict in the Balkans. 
See generally PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE ROLE OF JUSTICE IN PEACE BUILDING: 
WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2002). The United Nations 
thereafter established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to preside over crimes 
committed during the civil war in Rwanda. See generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1998).  
 44. See Yee, supra note 11.  
 45. Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2).  
 46. Id. art. 27 (stating that any immunities or procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person under national or international law shall not bar the ICC from exercising 
jurisdiction over that person).  
 47. Id. arts. 13–15.  
 48. Rudolph, supra note 11, at 679–80; Yee, supra note 11, at 143–52; Goldsmith & Krasner, 
supra note 11. 
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warrants to bring those who have committed mass atrocities to stand trial 
for their crimes in The Hague.
49
  
In sum, the treaty states enacted to create the ICC envisions a powerful 
and independent prosecutor and court that can significantly invade in the 
realm of state sovereignty:
50
 states committing to the ICC face the 
possibility that if government officials or any of its nationals commit 
atrocities, they will be prosecuted at the ICC unless the state prosecutes 
those atrocities domestically.  
II. EXISTING LITERATURE EXPLAINING COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES  
Although there is little scholarly research empirically testing the 
question of why states committed to the treaty creating the ICC in 
particular, there is an ample literature which examines state decisions to 
join international institutions in general, including international human 
rights treaties. This Article groups this literature according to its 
theoretical underpinnings as follows: ―the rationalist view‖ and ―the 
normative view.‖ The rationalist view assumes that states are self-
interested actors that behave based on the logic of consequences. Under 
this view, states will commit to treaties where the costs of commitment are 
low or where the costs of commitment are otherwise outweighed by some 
benefits that may be derived from joining the treaty. By contrast, under the 
normative view, states may ratify human rights treaties even if 
commitment is costly—such as a situation in which the state is actually 
unable to comply with treaty terms. Under the normative view, this occurs 
because ratification of treaties embracing positive norms may simply be 
the appropriate thing to do if a state is to be viewed as legitimate.
51
 Of 
course, states may also conclude that doing what is appropriate and 
embracing the norms favored by other important or influential actors 
provides additional benefits that flow from being viewed as legitimate. For 
example, by ratifying human rights treaties, states may be able to reap 
extra-treaty benefits such as increased aid or trade.  
 
 
 49. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 58.  
 50. See, e.g., Yee, supra note 11, at 143–52; Rudolph, supra note 11, at 679; Fehl, supra note 35, 
at 375. 
 51. See, e.g., JAMES C. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 160–62 (1989) (comparing the logic of consequences, which 
assumes that behavior is willful and motivated by preferences and expectations about consequences, 
with the logic of appropriateness, which assumes that actions are driven by what is necessary and 
appropriate under the circumstances).  
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A. The Rationalist View  
Under a rationalist view, states engage in cost/benefit calculations and 
join those treaties that are least costly and most beneficial to them.
52
 Those 
costs and benefits will often be incurred or derived in the future after 
ratification. However, states’ pre-ratification determinations regarding any 
future costs and benefits may be based on calculations that are more or 
less retrospective or prospective in nature. As discussed below, according 
to some theories, states will, and can, determine the likely consequences of 
treaty commitment by looking to their past practices and actions. 
Essentially, states will base their predictions about future behavior on what 
the record shows they used to do. On the other hand, according to some 
theories, the treaty’s potential to influence state practices and actions in the 
future may impose costs or benefits that will guide state determinations 
about the consequences of treaty ratification. Thus, even where past 
practices may suggest compliance will be difficult, a state may commit to 
a treaty based on calculations about what it expects the future to look like. 
1. Retrospective Calculations 
a. Compliance Costs: Domestic Practices and Policies 
The most direct costs associated with treaty ratification, and the costs a 
state will likely calculate by looking backwards at its recent past practices 
and policies, are those related to compliance with treaty terms. According 
to George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, most governments 
prefer to guard against restrictions on their sovereignty, and thus, will 
avoid costly commitments—namely, commitments to institutions with 
which they cannot comply. Indeed, these scholars suggest that the reason 
for widespread compliance with at least some treaties is because states do 
not negotiate or join treaties that require ―deep‖ cooperation, defined as 
cooperation that would require the state to depart from what it otherwise 
would have done in the absence of the treaty.
53
 Therefore, states wishing 
to guard their sovereignty and avoid costly decisions will have incentives 
to look backwards to determine whether their practices and policies are 
consistent with those required by the terms of the treaty. This theory posits 
 
 
 52. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1823, 1860 (2002) (noting that an important benefit of the rationalist view of state behavior is 
that it provides predictions about how countries will act inasmuch as it assumes that states weigh the 
costs and benefits of their actions and proceed where benefits outweigh costs).  
 53. Id.  
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that to the extent their practices and policies are consistent, states should 
commit to the treaty since compliance costs—and the concomitant loss to 
state sovereignty—should be minimal.54  
In the case of international human rights treaties, a state’s domestic 
political realities and its prevailing human rights practices should best 
predict its compliance costs, which will in turn affect the state’s 
willingness to commit to the treaty. First, regarding the state’s domestic 
political configuration, democratic states generally protect basic human 
rights, apply the rule of law fairly, and limit state power. Consequently, 
for those states, state policies should be such that ratification of human 
rights treaties will not affect the status quo ante.
55
 Autocratic regimes, on 
the other hand, tend not to place legal restraints on their own power. 
Therefore, because they have not in the past committed to protecting 
human rights or limited their own ability to respond violently, these states 
may conclude that ratifying human rights treaties poses significant risks to 
their sovereignty; if they maintain the status quo ante, these states risk 
failing to comply with treaty terms.
56
 Aside from their political 
configuration, however, states with a recent history of better domestic 
human rights practices should also be more likely to ratify treaties 
protecting human rights. For these states, too, the costs of 
noncompliance—and the risks to state sovereignty—should be low.57  
The nature and terms of the ICC treaty, however, may impose 
additional compliance costs on states than might some other international 
human rights treaties. Because the crimes covered by the ICC include ―war 
crimes,‖ states with a greater military presence may face a greater risk of 
prosecution of their citizens—and therefore view ICC ratification as more 
costly—than states with a smaller military presence. For example, the 
United States argued during treaty negotiations that its military forces 
should be exempted from ICC jurisdiction because those forces were 
present throughout the world, were critical to international peace and 
 
 
 54. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter M. Barsoom, Is the Good News about 
Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996). 
 55. Wade M. Cole, Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to the International 
Human Rights Covenants, 1966–1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 472, 475–76 (2005).  
 56. See id.  
 57. See id.; see also Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23 SOC. F. 724, 
737 (2008). Along these same lines, Wotipka and Tsutsui also suggest that compliance with human 
rights norms may be easier for wealthier and more developed countries. Id. at 737. Like other scholars 
testing state commitment to international human rights treaties, they include a measure for economic 
development in their empirical models to capture this idea. I similarly include such a measure in my 
model. See infra Part IV.C. 
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security, and would be more exposed to more accusations of wrongdoing 
than would citizens of other states with less international military 
involvement.
58
 As this example demonstrates, even if a state is a 
democracy and otherwise protects human rights, if it has a large military 
presence within the world community, this may lead it to conclude that 
compliance with the ICC treaty is more costly and requires more policy 
change (perhaps in the form of military training) than it is willing to take 
on. The reverse, of course, would likely be true for states with a smaller 
military presence.
59
  
Finally, the costs of complying with international human rights treaties 
are reduced for states with practices and policies that do not conform to 
treaty terms so long as the mechanisms designed to enforce compliance 
are weak or nonexistent.
60
 For example, where treaties require only that 
states self-report compliance, the punishment states face for failing to 
report or reporting poor conduct is negative comments from the treaty’s 
committee members. But, states risk negative comments by other states 
and NGOs when they violate human rights norms in their territories even 
absent ratification of a human rights treaty. Because treaties with weak 
enforcement mechanisms are not designed to make states accountable for 
their commitments, even rights-abusing governments may readily bind 
themselves to international treaties designed to promote and protect human 
rights, knowing full well that they will not face any real challenges to their 
practices. 
Indeed, as noted above, a number of studies have found that states with 
a history of poor human rights practices are just as likely as states with 
good practices to bind themselves to treaties which require them to protect 
human rights, but that those states thereafter do not change their poor 
practices. For example, Oona Hathaway found that non-democratic nations 
with poor human rights ratings were just as likely, and sometimes even 
more likely, to commit to international human rights treaties than non-
 
 
 58. See BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 161 (2000).  
 59. The results of empirical tests of this theory, however, have been mixed. For example, in their 
conference paper, Michael Struett and Steven Weldon found that states that spent more of their 
national income on defense and those that had a greater share of world military spending (when 
controlling for democracy) were less likely to ratify the treaty creating the ICC. Michael J. Struett & 
Steven A. Weldon, Why Do States Join the International Criminal Court: A Typology (Mar. 1, 2007) 
(presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting). On the other hand, Judith Kelley 
found that a state’s relative military power (measured as military spending in millions of dollars) did 
not predict a state’s affinity for the ICC—or its likelihood of later signing a bilateral immunity 
agreement with the United States. Kelley, supra note 23, at 580.  
 60. Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note 54, at 379, 388–92; Hathaway, The Cost of 
Commitment, supra note 19, at 1832, 1834–36.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] STATE COMMITMENT TO THE ICC 493 
 
 
 
 
democratic nations with better human rights ratings.
61
 She attributed this 
finding to the absence of both external and internal enforcement 
mechanisms.
62
 Specifically, not only did the treaties themselves lack 
significant enforcement mechanisms, but autocratic nations also lacked 
internal enforcement mechanisms in the form of an active and vocal civil 
society or others who ordinarily push for better practices in democracies.
63
 
In another study, Hathaway found that approximately the same percentage 
of countries with the most recorded acts of torture ratified the Convention 
Against Torture as did countries with no recorded acts of torture.
64
 Emilie 
M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui have reported that the average 
state has ratified a steadily increasing number of human rights treaties, but 
that the percentage of states reportedly repressing human rights has grown 
over time, suggesting that states may ratify weakly-enforced treaties only 
as window dressing without any intention of actually improving their 
practices.
65
  
b. Domestic Ratification Costs 
In addition to compliance costs, another cost that may influence a 
state’s ratification behavior and which may require states to examine their 
past and current practices, is the cost of the state’s domestic ratification 
processes. Beth Simmons identifies the political domestic ratification 
process as a primary cost that governments face when deciding whether or 
not to commit to international treaties.
66
 For a state to bind itself to an 
international human rights treaty, it must follow whatever domestic 
processes are required to make any ratification legal and legitimate. As 
Simmons notes, governments face the fewest political costs to treaty 
ratification when they fully control the process, such as when the head of 
state has the sole right to make ratification decisions. However, many 
states are subject to a much more onerous process; states may require 
parliamentary debate or majority or supermajority votes by legislative 
bodies before the government is permitted to bind itself to an international 
treaty. With the presence of a greater number of domestic legislative veto 
players, governments may face opposition to, or delays in, the treaty 
 
 
 61. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, supra note 19, at 1856–57.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, supra note 20, at 1982–87. 
 65. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 20, at 1374. 
 66. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 68 (2009). 
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ratification process that can make ratification of an international human 
rights treaty too politically costly for a government to pursue.
67
  
2. Prospective Calculations 
a. Uncertainty Costs 
According to some theories, and regardless of their likely compliance 
costs based on past practices or treaty ratification processes, states will 
also have reason to look into the future to determine the likely costs 
associated with ratifying a particular treaty. For example, some states may 
face unique uncertainty costs that will cause them to avoid ratifying, or 
move slowly in ratifying, international human rights treaties. In particular, 
states that follow a common law tradition may find commitment to 
international legal tribunals more costly than would states following a civil 
law tradition.
68
 Generally speaking, the treaties to which a state commits 
also become part of that state’s law.69 In the common law tradition, 
however, the judiciary is generally independent from the government and 
there is some possibility that it will apply treaty law in a way that creates 
new government obligations to the state’s citizens and others.70 This 
uncertainty in how treaty law will be applied in the future after ratification 
may cause common law states to be wary of ratifying international human 
rights treaties—even where they agree with its principles and have policies 
in place that enable compliance with treaty terms.  
b. Credible Commitment 
Even where the costs of complying with treaty terms are significant, 
Beth Simmons and Allison Danner suggest that some states rationally 
calculating the costs of treaty commitment will conclude that those costs 
are outweighed by the future domestic benefits states can obtain by 
credibly committing to a treaty with strong enforcement mechanisms.
71
 
Specifically, Simmons and Danner suggest that in the case of the ICC, 
non-democracies with poor human rights practices will join the court 
precisely because it has strong enforcement mechanisms that will allow 
 
 
 67. See id.  
 68. See id. at 71; see also Jay Goodliffe & Darren G. Hawkins, Explaining Commitment: States 
and the Convention Against Torture, 68 J. POL. 358, 364 (2006).  
 69. SIMMONS, supra note 66, at 71. 
 70. Id. at 71–74.  
 71. Simmons & Danner, supra note 23, at 233–36. 
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those states to signal a credible commitment to their domestic audiences to 
end the cycle of violence and, instead, in the future, respond non-violently 
to crises.
72
 These scholars argue that where the potential gains from 
making a credible commitment are high, the sovereignty costs of joining 
the court are overridden, and the state will be rational in deciding to tie its 
hands and commit to acting differently in the future.
73
  
In short, Simmons and Danner argue that non-democratic states with 
poor human rights practices and a history of violence have incentives to 
calculate the costs of ratifying the ICC by looking ahead rather than 
backwards. The results of event history analysis provide evidence 
supporting their theory. Simmons and Danner find that states that have 
experienced mass atrocities and that have poor practices (measured by 
whether the state had experienced a civil war with more than 25 deaths 
between the period 1990 and 1998) are likely to join the ICC as long as 
those states also have weak institutions of domestic accountability 
(measured by, among other things, democracy and rule of law ratings).
74
 
States with poor practices, but strong institutions of domestic 
accountability, however, are less likely to join the ICC, a result which 
Simmons and Danner attribute to the fact that such states already have 
domestic institutions—such as a civil society and courts that follow the 
rule of law—which can ensure leaders will be held accountable for any 
future acts of violence.
75
  
Simmons and Danner are likely correct that some states make 
prospective calculations and join the ICC notwithstanding their past and 
present inability to comply with treaty terms so as to commit to better their 
practices in the future. But I am not convinced that non-democratic states 
would overwhelmingly calculate their ICC commitment decisions in the 
way these scholars suggest. Rather, I am more persuaded by the 
underlying logic of Oona Hathaway’s argument, which suggests that states 
are more retrospective in calculating the costs of their treaty commitments 
and will be less likely to commit where the evidence about their past 
practices suggests they cannot comply with treaty terms—unless, of 
course, treaty enforcement mechanisms are weak. Indeed, Hathaway 
argues that the reason autocratic states with poor practices readily commit 
to human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms is due to the 
 
 
 72. Id. at 233–36. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 238 (discussing measures for these two main explanatory variables).  
 75. Id. at 240.  
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absence of both external and internal enforcement mechanisms.
76
 Thus, 
according to Hathaway’s reasoning, autocratic states with poor practices 
are not committing to international human rights treaties because they 
want to credibly commit and tie their hands so that they cannot act 
violently in the future. Instead, for the most part, those autocratic states 
with poor practices commit to international human rights treaties because 
commitment will not tie their hands, thus enabling them to continue to 
disrespect human rights and repress their domestic audience without 
facing consequences for doing so. And, it makes sense that an autocratic 
regime which has declined to place domestic constraints on its power to do 
and act as it pleases may not want to place international constraints on that 
same power by committing to an international human rights treaty like the 
ICC which has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms. Thus, and as 
Hathaway found, I expect that non-democracies with poor practices will 
typically be wary of joining treaties other than those with weak 
enforcement mechanisms that cannot be used to punish noncompliant 
behavior.  
In any event, aside from the logic of Simmons’ and Danner’s theory, I 
am not convinced that their ―recent civil wars‖ variable captures the 
concepts it was designed to measure: namely, a state’s level of human 
rights practices or its likelihood of committing mass atrocities.
77
 First, 
twenty-five battle deaths in a year does not necessarily capture ―violent 
states‖ or states at risk of committing mass atrocities since twenty-five 
battle deaths is not an enormous number and does not account for whether 
the deaths were the result of ―criminal‖ action or poor practices on the part 
of the government or any rebel group. In addition, twenty-five battle 
deaths are not even sufficient to constitute a civil war as most scholars 
understand it. The Correlates of War dataset, which is widely used, 
classifies civil wars as those having over 1000 war-related casualties per 
year of conflict.
78
 If ―recent civil wars‖ does not capture the concept of a 
state with poor human rights practices or a tendency towards committing 
mass atrocities, there may be reason to question Simmons’ and Danner’s 
empirical results showing that autocratic states with these qualities were 
 
 
 76. Hathaway, The Costs of Commitment, supra note 19, at 1856–57.  
 77. Simmons and Danner state that the ―recent civil wars‖ measure is designed to capture states 
―at risk for committing mass atrocities.‖ Simmons & Danner, supra note 23, at 237.  
 78. See Meredith Reid Sarkees, The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997, 18 
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 1 (2000), available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/cow2%20data/ 
WarData/IntraState/Intra-State%20War%20Format%20(V%203-0).htm [hereinafter ―Correlates of 
War Dataset‖]. 
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more likely to commit to the ICC so as to tie their hands against acting 
violently in the future.  
Finally, even accepting that ―recent civil wars‖ is an acceptable 
indicator for the concepts tested, an examination of Simmons’ and 
Danner’s appendix of states that have experienced such ―recent civil wars‖ 
provides evidence contrary to their theory.
79
 It shows that the autocratic 
states among those with recent civil wars were not more likely than the 
democratic states to commit to the ICC. Of the twenty-two democratic 
states listed, nine had joined the court, while thirteen had not.
80
 Of the 
non-democratic states listed, nine had joined the court, but some sixteen 
had not.
81
 Thus, even putting aside questions about the ―recent civil wars‖ 
measure, it seems that a smaller percentage of the non-democratic states 
had joined the court—yet these non-democratic states with ―recent civil 
wars‖ are the very states that Simmons and Danner argue will join the 
court to demonstrate their credible commitment to end the cycle of 
violence. For all of these reasons, I am persuaded by the logic of Oona 
Hathaway’s argument and expect that autocratic states with poor human 
rights practices will likely commit to international human rights treaties 
with weak enforcement mechanisms, but be wary of committing to 
international human rights treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms 
that could impose external constraints on the states’ abilities to do as they 
please.  
3. Democratic Lock-In  
Finally, and along these same lines, Andrew Moravcsik also suggests 
that some states will have reasons to be forward-looking in rationally 
calculating the costs and benefits associated with ratifying a particular 
 
 
 79. The Appendix A referenced in the Simmons and Danner article published in International 
Organizations is not on their referenced website. See Beth A. Simmons, Abstract of Credible 
Commitments and the International Criminal Court, http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/publications/ 
credible-commitments. Accordingly, I used the Appendix A in their February 2008 draft. See Beth A. 
Simmons & Allison Danner, Draft, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, app. 
A (Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://ducis.jhfc.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
archive/documents/Simmons_paper.pdf. 
 80. Appendix A shows that of the democratic states with ―recent civil wars,‖ Colombia, Djibouti, 
Georgia, Mali, Mexico, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Spain joined the court. Simmons & Danner, 
supra note 79.  
 81. Appendix A shows that of the non-democratic states with ―recent civil wars,‖ Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Peru, Tajikistan, and Uganda 
joined the court. Id.  
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treaty.
82
 Specifically, Moravcsik argues that new transitioning democracies 
can outweigh the sovereignty costs associated with joining international 
human rights treaties by locking in the treaty’s democratic principles and 
thereby constraining the activities of future governments that may seek to 
subvert democracy.
83
 In testing this theory, Moravcsik found evidence that 
dictatorships and established democracies voted against binding human 
rights guarantees during negotiations of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ―ECHR‖), 
whereas the newly-created democracies supported binding guarantees.
84
 
Accordingly, some newly democratic countries may conclude that the 
costs of complying with international human rights treaties are relatively 
low since they would have adopted—or at least intend to adopt—policies 
that are consistent with treaty terms. Furthermore, the benefits that new 
democracies may realize by locking future governments into following 
their liberal policies may outweigh the risk that the state may not be able 
to immediately and fully comply with treaty terms. However, when 
Moravcsik’s theory was tested in connection with state decisions to 
support the Convention Against Torture and the ICC treaty, it found little 
support.
85
  
B. The Normative View 
Under the normative view, states will join international human rights 
treaties even if it may not appear to be in their rational self-interest to do 
so—for example, because at the precise moment in time, compliance with 
treaty terms may be difficult. According to normative theories, states act 
based on the ―logic of appropriateness‖ and indicate their commitment to 
particular international norms because they are led to believe that behavior 
consistent with those norms is appropriate and necessary for states wishing 
to be viewed as legitimate.
86
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 
 
 
 82. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 225–30 (2000). 
 83. See id.  
 84. See id. at 232. Similarly, Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse have concluded that newly 
democratizing nations are especially likely to enter international organizations because doing so would 
allow the state to ―credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms and . . . reduce the prospect of 
reversions to authoritarianism. . . .‖ Edward D. Mansfield & Jon C. Pevehouse, Democratization and 
International Organizations, 60 INT’L ORG. 137, 138 (2006).  
 85. See Goodliffe & Hawkins, Explaining Commitment, supra note 68, at 365; Goodliffe & 
Hawkins, A Funny Thing Happened, supra note 23, at 984. 
 86. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 5–6 
(1996).  
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argue that after new norms are adopted by a significant number of states, a 
―norm cascade‖ will follow, such that other states will feel pressured to 
commit to the norm as well.
87
 Norms are spread through a number of 
different channels, and states are subjected to normative pressures from 
powerful democracies, transnational governance regimes like the United 
Nations, and global civil society.
88
  
In this regard, and as many scholars have noted, states may initially 
succumb to normative pressures because they are rewarded for doing so 
with, for example: investment, aid, and trade.
89
 Although they would 
prefer to guard their sovereignty and avoid external constraints, states may 
join international human rights treaties in the hopes that ratification will 
make them appear more legitimate, and thus, more suitable recipients of 
investment. Weaker or poorer states may commit to international human 
rights treaties because they are indirectly or directly pressured to do so by 
the greater powers on which they rely for aid or trade.
90
 It makes sense that 
states would believe more powerful and wealthier states want them to 
embrace favorable human rights norms in order to receive certain benefits 
from them. As Emilie M. Hafner-Burton points out, many preferential 
trade agreements not only govern market access, but tie that access to a 
state’s ability to comply with various human rights standards.91  
States may also be pressured directly or indirectly to embrace the 
norms and policies that their neighbors embrace. If many states in a region 
are committing to a particular treaty, other states may feel pressured to 
similarly commit.
92
 A state’s ratification of international human rights 
treaties can signal to others in the region that it is a legitimate member of 
that region. In addition, states may be led to understand that with their 
legitimacy established, they will be eligible for other rewards—for 
example, participation in regional trade arrangements.
93
  
 
 
 87. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
52 INT’L ORG. 889, 900–04 (1998).  
 88. See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 57, at 736.  
 89. See, e.g., Goodliffe & Hawkins, Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention Against 
Torture, supra note 68, at 361 (citing Frank Schimmelfennig, The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, 
Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, 55 INT’L ORG. 47 (2001) and 
Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in 
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000)).  
 90. See SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 77; Wotipka & Tsutsui, 
supra note 57, at 734–35.  
 91. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements 
Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (2005).  
 92. Goodliffe & Hawkins, Explaining Commitment, supra note 68, at 361. 
 93. See, e.g., id. 
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In addition to the pressure from their neighbors to signal appreciation 
of certain norms, where the ICC is concerned, states may have been 
subjected to normative pressure to join the ICC by pro-ICC NGOs. In his 
study of state decisions to join the ICC, Michael Struett found anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that NGOs played a large role in convincing states 
that joining the ICC was necessary to be considered a legitimate state: one 
that would promote the appropriate norm of supporting an international 
court to help end impunity for crimes against humanity.
94
  
III. STRONG ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AS A CREDIBLE THREAT 
As is evident from the above discussion, there may be many reasons 
why states are motivated to commit to, or refuse to commit to, 
international human rights treaties. However, I focus on compliance costs 
based on the specific language of the ICC treaty and the backward-looking 
calculations that states should make if they want to avoid significant losses 
to their sovereignty for failing to comply with treaty terms. I do so for 
several reasons. First, it is worth noting that on the whole, international 
human rights treaties are different from other treaties—such as arms 
control agreements and trade agreements—which by their very terms 
provide tangible reciprocal benefits to states in exchange for their pledge 
to act in particular ways.
95
 Second, in all cases of treaty ratification, one 
primary guide of a state’s obligations and the risks associated with failing 
to comply with those obligations is the terms and provisions of the treaty. 
For states behaving according to the logic of consequences, treaty terms 
should be the best and first guide as to whether treaty ratification makes 
sense from a cost/benefit standpoint. Furthermore, in the case of the ICC, 
the institutional design of the treaty and its enforcement mechanisms are 
unique. Accordingly, this is not a case where states can look to other 
similar treaties or the actions of treaty bodies that oversee compliance with 
other similar treaties to help them interpret the actual strength and 
meaning of the ICC’s enforcement mechanisms—and therefore, the 
likelihood that they will be held accountable for failing to comply with 
treaty terms. While states that wait to ratify the ICC treaty may be able to 
look at the actions of the ICC prosecutor and the court to help them 
determine whether the treaty’s enforcement mechanisms are actually as 
 
 
 94. MICHAEL J. STRUETT, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: NGO’S, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 131–48 (2008). 
 95. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, supra note 19, at 1823. 
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strong as they appear to be on paper, states that ratified promptly had only 
the treaty text on which to rely when making their commitment decisions.  
In addition, I argue that by contrast to the previous international human 
rights treaties which contain only weak enforcement mechanisms, states 
should inherently have something to fear from an independent prosecutor 
and court. The failure to comply with the ICC treaty’s terms carries grave 
consequences: the possibility of an ICC prosecution of the state’s leaders 
or citizens. Because the ICC’s enforcement mechanisms carry with them a 
potential significant sovereignty loss, doing what is appropriate is more 
likely something that states will consider after they determine they can 
comply with the treaty. In short, states should view the ICC’s relatively 
strong enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and act accordingly. 
Thus, even though prior studies have found that states often ratify human 
rights treaties without regard to their ability to comply,
96
 state decisions 
about whether to commit to the ICC should be guided primarily by 
compliance concerns. 
Finally, I focus on treaty terms because in the international human 
rights context (and others as well), a treaty’s institutional design and its 
enforcement mechanisms can have implications for understanding state 
behavior and also the likelihood that the treaty’s purposes and goals will 
be realized. As explained above, the ICC treaty has an institutional design 
and enforcement mechanisms that set it apart from other prior international 
human rights treaties. Presumably, states structured the ICC treaty in this 
way because they wanted to ensure compliance with its terms and deter 
human rights abuses by ending the culture of impunity whereby domestic 
governments either commit such abuses or fail to bring to justice those 
within their jurisdiction who perpetrate atrocities. Knowing why states 
commit to such a regime, and the kinds of states that commit to such a 
regime, should provide insights about whether structuring international 
human rights treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms can ensure 
greater compliance with international human rights norms.  
When I refer to enforcement mechanisms in this context,
97
 I refer to the 
formal grant of power from states to some entity or institution with 
authority to oversee state compliance with treaty terms. The weakest 
 
 
 96. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 97. I draw on several scholarly works for this discussion about enforcement and legalization. See 
Darren Hawkins, Explaining Costly Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms, 
48 INT’L STUD. Q. 779, 781 (2004); Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 385 (2000); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 21; Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A 
Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L ORG. 599, 603–05 (1986).  
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enforcement mechanisms are characterized by ―soft law‖ provisions—
using the language of Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal.
98
 ―Soft law‖ 
exists where legal arrangements are weakened by lacking clear 
obligations, precision, or a clear delegation of authority or responsibility.
99
 
Stronger, ―hard law‖ enforcement mechanisms are precise and binding: for 
example, a formal grant of power to a committee or court to engage in 
authoritative, institutionalized, and legally binding decision making.
100
 As 
Darren Hawkins notes, strong enforcement requires the existence of 
authorized decision makers who are ―officially empowered by states to 
interpret and apply the rule of law, and [who] control resources that can be 
used to prevent abuses or to punish offenders.‖101 States should view 
strong enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat because they are 
costly; they impose precise and binding restrictions on the state’s 
sovereign right to control matters of domestic governance.  
As a rule, international human rights treaties are characterized by ―soft 
law‖ enforcement mechanisms102 as they are lacking clear obligations, 
precision, or delegation of authority or responsibility.
103
 Traditional human 
rights institutions—such as the CAT and the ICCPR—require only that the 
state submit regular reports to a committee about its efforts to comply with 
treaty terms.
104
 Additional articles and the optional protocols to these 
treaties have somewhat more significant enforcement mechanisms in that 
states can recognize the competence of a committee to receive and review 
state or individual complaints alleging that a state party has not fulfilled its 
treaty obligations and has either failed to protect or abused human 
rights.
105
 However, in the present system, committees are not empowered 
to order a remedy for any violations they find: if the matter cannot be 
resolved via negotiation, the committee is generally limited to 
 
 
 98. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 21, at 422–24.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 421–22.  
 101. Hawkins, supra note 97, at 781.  
 102. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 21, at 422–24.  
 103. This absence of enforcement mechanisms in international human rights treaties is a fact Oona 
Hathaway emphasizes in explaining her results which showed that non-democracies with poor human 
rights ratings were just as likely as non-democracies with good human rights rating to commit to such 
treaties. She notes that non-democracies have few or no internal enforcement mechanisms—such as 
domestic civil society—which might pressure non-democracies to honor their commitments. Thus, in 
the absence of external enforcement mechanisms associated with the treaty, non-democracies could 
conclude that commitment was essentially costless, and perhaps even beneficial, as it would enable 
them to appear legitimate. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, supra note 19, at 1834, 1856.  
 104. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 105. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
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summarizing its activities in a report.
106
 Moreover, according to the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as of August 
2010, the procedures for interstate complaints had never been used.
107
  
In sum, in none of the above instances have states delegated to the 
committees the power to make legally binding decisions—meaning that 
the enforcement mechanisms associated with these traditional human 
rights treaties are far from ―strong.‖108 This does not mean the 
enforcement mechanisms are not helpful or meaningful steps in inducing 
state compliance or improving human rights. The reports, decisions, and 
comments by the committees on state noncompliance can be used by 
NGOs or individuals in an effort to shame the state into compliance. Other 
states may also use the evidence contained in those reports as ammunition 
to force a state into compliance; for example, states may withhold aid or 
trade until a state agrees to improve its human rights record. Even if a state 
fails to cooperate with its obligations or follow committee 
recommendations, the committee’s decisions and reports may be valuable 
in persuading the state to comply. However, regarding the level of the 
enforcement mechanisms to which states bind themselves pursuant to the 
treaty’s terms, the fact is that the committees do not have legally binding 
adjudicatory power with resources to compel compliance with their 
comments, views, and recommendations. Moreover, even if the state had 
not joined the particular treaty, NGOs, states, or civil society probably 
could find equivalent evidence about the state’s poor human rights 
practices to shame it into improving those practices.  
In contrast to these traditional human rights treaties, the ICC is 
governed by ―hard law‖ enforcement mechanisms. The ICC treaty 
describes in detail the elements of the covered crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.
109
 By the terms of the treaty, states have 
also designated to an independent entity the authority to determine that 
there is evidence to believe an individual or group committed one of the 
 
 
 106. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 41(h); CAT, supra note 18, art. 21(h). 
 107. See Human Rights Bodies—Complaints Procedures, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm. 
 108. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. 
CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 63 (1999) (discussing the 
Committee Against Torture); Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims In A World Of Massive Violations: 
What Role For The Human Rights Committee, in PHILIP ALSTON & JAMES CRAWFORD, THE FUTURE 
OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING 37 (2000) (noting that the Human Rights Committee has no 
authority to act punitively against any state offending the ICCPR or to impose sanctions against it).  
 109. Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 5–8.  
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covered crimes within the territory of a State Party.
110
 In addition, they 
have delegated the power to determine whether the state which would 
otherwise have jurisdiction over the matter is itself either unwilling or 
unable to prosecute the wrongdoers.
111
 Furthermore, the ICC has resources 
to compel compliance with its determinations: it may issue arrest warrants 
to bring persons or groups to the ICC in The Hague to stand trial for their 
alleged crimes; it may try alleged offenders; and it may sentence those 
found guilty to prison terms.
112
  
Of course, the ICC cannot effectuate arrests without the assistance of 
States Parties since the institution itself has no international police force. 
In addition, even though States Parties commit to cooperate in arresting 
those individuals for whom arrest warrants are issued,
113
 the ICC has no 
police force to make states comply. Thus, while some states have 
cooperated in bringing suspects to The Hague for trial,
114
 at least a couple 
of African nations have refused to arrest President Omar Al-Bashir of 
Sudan for whom an arrest warrant was recently issued.
115
 Nevertheless, the 
power delegated to the ICC is still of a legally binding nature. While a 
suspect may be able to escape arrest by staying in state or hiding (and 
suspects can always escape arrest in similar ways even under domestic 
criminal law systems where police forces can effectuate arrests), those 
subject to an arrest warrant are not completely free to do as they please. 
Even President Bashir likely feels the threat of the warrant for his arrest; 
while he has traveled to some friendly countries in Africa, Bashir probably 
will not risk a trip to Europe. The warrant is a legal document backed by 
the power of the law, and States Parties are required to comply with 
warrants for arrest issued by the ICC.
116
 Indeed, the power of the fact of 
 
 
 110. See id. arts. 1–4 (describing the establishment and powers of the court), 15 (describing the 
powers of the ICC prosecutor).  
 111. Id. art. 17.  
 112. Id. arts. 58, 77.  
 113. Id. art. 86. 
 114. The former Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo—who was the subject 
of a sealed arrest warrant—was arrested during a visit to Belgium. Congo Ex-Official Is Held In 
Belgium on War Crimes Charges, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at A13. 
 115. Both Chad and Kenya are ICC States Parties that recently hosted President Bashir in their 
countries notwithstanding the warrant for his arrest. According to a September 21, 2010 ICC press 
release, Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs acknowledged Kenya’s obligation to cooperate with the 
ICC, but also highlighted its competing obligations to the African Union, regional stability, and peace 
in explaining Kenya’s refusal to arrest President Bashir while he was in the country. Press Release, 
ICC, President of the Assembly Meets Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kenya (Sept. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/Press+Releases/Press+Releases+2010/President+of+ 
the+Assembly+meets+Minister+of+Foreign+Affairs+of+Kenya.htm.  
 116. Rome Statute, arts. 58, 89. 
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potential arrest warrants was recently demonstrated when in June 2010, 
Darfur suspects appeared in The Hague ―voluntarily‖ so as to avoid having 
warrants issued for their arrest.
117
 
Accordingly, because the ICC treaty has relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms that are legally binding in nature, state ratification behavior 
will likely be influenced by states’ retrospective calculations about how 
their past practices predict their ability to comply with treaty terms. 
Principally, compliance requires a state and its nationals to commit to 
having relatively good human rights practices. Where nationals of States 
Parties do not commit any of the covered crimes, there will be no 
opportunity for the ICC to even potentially obtain jurisdiction over a 
matter. Therefore, a sufficient condition for ICC ratification is good 
human rights practices, since states with good practices can conclude that 
ratification will not lead to a costly loss of sovereignty.  
Secondarily, pursuant to the ICC treaty’s complementarity provision,118 
compliance also may require a state to have relatively independent and 
capable domestic law enforcement institutions to prosecute human rights 
violations—in the event that the state’s government and/or citizens do 
commit the kinds of mass atrocities that would otherwise be within the 
ICC’s jurisdictional purview. Independent judicial institutions that follow 
the rule of law should be able to punish even governments that would 
otherwise be ―unwilling‖119 to punish themselves or their compatriots who 
commit human rights violations. Capable domestic law enforcement 
institutions with resources and sufficient expertise should be ―able‖120 to 
conduct the kind of investigations and prosecutions that will ensure that 
perpetrators of mass atrocities are punished for their conduct. Of course, 
because states with good human rights practices should not expect to 
commit the kinds of atrocities covered by the ICC treaty, they can still 
conclude that ICC commitment is relatively costless even if their domestic 
law enforcement institutions are not independent or capable.  
For states with bad human rights practices, however, the cost of 
compliance calculations will be less straightforward. For these states, 
because their government or citizens may commit the kinds of crimes 
 
 
 117. See Press Release, ICC, As Darfur Rebel Commanders Surrender to the Court, ICC 
Prosecutor ―Welcomes Compliance with the Court’s Decisions and with Resolution 1593 (2005) of the 
Security Council.‖ (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and% 
20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050309/press%20release/pr548 (addressing the 
arrival of two Darfur rebel commanders to answer charges and face prosecution for their conduct).  
 118. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17(1)(a). 
 119. See id. art. 17(2).  
 120. See id. art. 17(3). 
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covered by the ICC treaty, complying with treaty terms necessarily rests 
on whether they are able to take advantage of the treaty’s complementarity 
provision. But, as an initial matter, relying solely on the availability of the 
treaty’s complementarity provision for compliance is risky because 
pursuant to treaty terms, the ICC prosecutor and court are authorized to 
determine whether any domestic prosecutions are adequate to ward off an 
ICC investigation.
121
 In addition, however, the data shows that there are 
relatively few states with poor practices that are also likely to have 
independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions (based on 
either their rule of law scores or their democracy ratings). Thus, it may be 
that in most cases, states with bad human rights practices are also states 
where power is concentrated such that the government is able to abuse 
human rights or is complicit in human rights abuses and also controls the 
state machinery to such an extent that the judiciary is not independent and 
the rule of law is not fairly applied. In other words, not only may 
governments with poor practices risk having the ICC conclude that their 
domestic prosecutions are inadequate, but also they may be complicit in 
committing any human rights abuses and, therefore, be ―unwilling‖ to 
ensure that such abuses are punished. As such, although independent and 
capable law enforcement institutions should be a sufficient condition for 
states to conclude that ratification of the ICC treaty is relatively costless, I 
expect that in most cases, states with poor human rights practices will 
either be wary of relying solely on this condition, or will be ―unwilling‖ to 
do so.  
In sum, this Article suggests that good human rights practices and 
independent and capable domestic law enforcement institutions are each 
individually sufficient conditions for states to rationally commit to the ICC 
treaty and its relatively strong enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, if a 
state has either good human rights practices or independent and capable 
domestic law enforcement institutions, it should conclude that ratifying the 
ICC treaty does not pose a significant risk to its sovereignty, and the state 
should commit to the court. In addition, for a state to conclude that ICC 
ratification is essentially costless because the state can comply with treaty 
terms, either good human rights practices or independent and capable 
domestic law enforcement institutions are a necessary condition to 
ratification. However, because the ICC has the ability to determine 
whether the state’s domestic investigations and prosecutions are adequate 
 
 
 121. Id. art. 17. 
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to ward off ICC jurisdiction, good human rights practices are almost a 
necessary condition to ratification.  
The table below shows the commitment decisions this Article expects 
states to make based the theory outlined above. 
TABLE 1: STATE COMMITMENT DECISIONS EXPECTATIONS 
 
Low Likelihood of Human 
Rights Violation 
High Likelihood of Human 
Rights Violation 
Worse Domestic Law 
Enforcement 
Institutions 
Commit to ICC (since not 
likely to violate treaty terms) 
Least likely to commit to the 
ICC 
Better Domestic Law 
Enforcement 
Institutions 
Most likely to commit to the 
ICC 
Refuse to commit to the ICC 
(since can’t control ICC 
determinations about the quality 
of domestic prosecutions) [but 
also theoretically unlikely many 
states in this category] 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This Article tests the theories and hypotheses laid out above 
quantitatively. Specifically, it tests the credible threat theory and the idea 
that states will be more likely to commit to the ICC treaty and its relatively 
strong enforcement mechanisms only if their rational and retrospective 
cost calculations suggest they can comply with treaty terms and avoid a 
costly loss of sovereignty. The Article pits the credible threat theory 
against the credible commitment theory and normative theories described 
in Part II, above.  
If the credible threat theory is correct, the evidence should show that 
states with good human rights practices will be more likely than states 
with poor human rights practices to join the ICC. By contrast, according to 
the credible commitment theory, states with poor human rights practices 
that are also non-democracies (which, according to Table 5 is the case for 
most states with poor practices) should be most likely to ratify the ICC 
treaty since those states can use the ICC and its strong enforcement 
mechanisms to signal to their domestic audiences their intention to 
respond without violence in the future and to end impunity. Finally, if the 
normative theories advanced are correct, the evidence should show that 
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even states with poor human rights practices will commit to the ICC 
notwithstanding their inability to comply with treaty terms because they 
are directly or indirectly pressured to do so in order to obtain some 
uncertain or intangible future benefits.  
A. Methodology 
I use event history analysis, and a Cox proportional-hazards regression 
model, to test the credible threat theory—and to test it against the credible 
commitment and normative theories. Event history analysis is a good way 
to test state commitment to the ICC because it allows the researcher to 
incorporate both constant and time-varying factors into the quantitative 
model so as to test each state’s ―time until‖ ratification122 and what factors 
speed up or slow down that time line.
123
 Because we know the dates that 
countries have ratified the ICC treaty, I arrange the data quarterly to 
include that variation in the model. The results will be reported as hazard 
ratios, which will indicate the proportionate influence a given factor has on 
a state’s decision to commit to the ICC. Numbers greater than one indicate 
an increase in the hazard rate of ratification. Numbers less than one 
indicate a decrease in the hazard rate.  
B. Dependent Variable 
Ratification data regarding the ICC treaty was coded from information 
collected by the ICC. The data is assembled at quarterly intervals for more 
than 190 countries between 1998 and 2008. Countries existing in July 
1998 when the ICC treaty was adopted and available for ratification are ―at 
risk‖ of ratifying at that time. Countries established after that time enter 
the risk set upon independence—the time when they are eligible to ratify 
as a sovereign state. Countries at risk are given a value of 0 until they 
ratify. At the time of ratification, countries are assigned a value of 1. 
Countries that did not ratify by the end of 2008, when the observation 
 
 
 122. I use the term ―ratify‖ to refer to state decisions to commit to the ICC treaty by both 
ratification and accession since both methods equally commit the state to the court. In addition, most 
states committed to the ICC by ratification, which is the process used for commitment when the state 
has already previously signed the treaty.  
 123. For a comprehensive description of event history analysis, see generally PAUL D. ALLISON, 
EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (1984). See also HANS-
PETER BLOSSFELD, KATRIN GOLSCH & GOTZ ROHWER, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: STATISTICAL 
THEORY AND APPLICATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2007).  
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period here ends, are right-censored. By the end of 2008, some 108 states 
were States Parties to the treaty.
124
 
C. Independent Variables 
1. The Main Explanatory Variables: Level of Human Rights Practices 
and Quality of Domestic Law Enforcement Institutions 
Testing the potential for compliance with ICC treaty terms necessarily 
requires that any model include measures relating to the ability to comply. 
In this case, I include the variables that measure a state’s level of human 
rights practices and the quality of its domestic legal institutions.  
I use two main measures of a state’s human rights practices. First, the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset measures a state’s physical 
integrity based on data from U.S. State Department and Amnesty 
International reports.
125
 It conceives of physical integrity as an aggregate 
of four component parts which it assesses in terms of frequency: tortures, 
extrajudicial killings, political imprisonments, and disappearances.
126
 Each 
of the component parts receives a score of between 0 and 2. Scores are 
then aggregated to produce a final score of between 0 and 8—with 8 
representing the best human rights. The dataset covers 195 countries from 
between 1981 and 2008.
127
 
Second, genocide—a specific crime over which the ICC has 
jurisdiction—is measured using data on genocide and politicide.128 From 
that data, which exists for the years from 1955 to 2006, I create a 
dichotomous variable, putting states into a genocide category if they had a 
 
 
 124. Appendix A infra contains a list of the 108 states that had ratified the ICC treaty by the end 
of 2008, together with their dates of ratification.  
 125. See David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights 
Data Project, available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/faq.asp.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. I considered using the human rights measure from the Political Terror Scale 1976–2008. 
See Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett & Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976–2009, available at http:// 
www.politicalterrorscale.org. That data is also based on human rights reports issued by Amnesty 
International and the U.S. Department of State. However, it is based on an aggregate scale of 1 to 5 
and does not as specifically quantify human rights practices by disaggregating them into their 
component parts with assigned scores for each part. Also, it covers fewer countries: 185 instead of 
195. Finally, since both datasets cover the entire period in this study, I concluded that for all of the 
above reasons the Cingranelli-Richards dataset would be the best measure for this study.  
 128. Barbara Harff, Annual Data on Cases of Genocide and Politicide, 1955–2006, compiled for 
the United States Government’s State Failure Task Force, available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ 
genocide. 
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genocidal episode in that period and putting them in a non-genocidal 
category if they did not.
129
 
To capture whether the state possesses the trustworthy and developed 
law enforcement institutions necessary to prosecute any violations of the 
crimes covered by the ICC treaty within its own borders, I use a rule of 
law measure from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Research 
Indicators project.
130
 This indicator measures ―the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence.‖131 I chose to measure the overall ability of the state to 
comply with the ICC treaty’s terms regarding the complementarity 
provision using the rule of law measure because I believe it is the best 
available measure that is focused precisely on the state’s domestic law 
enforcement institutions. It is true, as discussed below, that the democracy 
measure should capture some aspects relevant to the quality of the state’s 
domestic law enforcement institutions—such as the independence of the 
judiciary—because that measure deals in part with constraints on the chief 
executive. But, the rule of law measure is solely focused on domestic 
crime and violence and the quality of the domestic law enforcement 
institutions to combat those problems. Accordingly, the rule of law 
measure should capture the idea of independent courts, thereby addressing 
the complementarity provision’s ―unwillingness‖ prong. It should also 
 
 
 129. I chose not to include a measure of ―recent civil wars‖ as did Simmons and Danner because, 
as noted above, I do not believe that measure accurately captures the concept of the level of a state’s 
human rights practices or the likelihood that it will commit a mass atrocity. See Simmons & Danner, 
supra note 23 and accompanying text. As noted above, I am not convinced that twenty-five battle 
deaths in a year are sufficient to constitute a civil war as most scholars understand it, particularly given 
that the widely-used Correlates of War Dataset classifies civil wars (intra-state wars) as those having 
over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict. Furthermore, I suggest that wars that produce so 
few yearly battle deaths would not accurately measure the concept the authors indicated they were 
capturing by that measure: namely, the states ―at risk for committing mass atrocities.‖ Id. at 237. In 
addition, the Simmons and Danner ―recent civil wars‖ measure does not account for whether the 
deaths were the result of ―criminal‖ action or poor practices on the part of the government or any rebel 
group. On the other hand, the Cingranelli-Richards data on human rights practices and the genocide 
data directly measure a state’s tendency to commit the kinds of human rights violations that would 
subject the state’s leaders and citizens to an ICC prosecution.  
 130. See WORLD BANK, Governance Matters 2009, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996–
2008, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. Although the data are 
available from 1996 to 2008, data were reported only biennially until 2002. Therefore, for the period 
between 1998 and 2002, I use the data from the immediate prior year to extrapolate missing data 
points. 
 131. See Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006, 4 (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4280, July 2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/07/10/000016406_20070710125923/Rendered/PDF/wps4280.pdf.  
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capture the idea of capable courts, thereby addressing the ―inability‖ prong 
of the complementarity provision. 
2. Control Variables: The Rationalist View 
To test the idea that states with democratic governments are more 
likely than those with autocratic governments to ratify the ICC, I include a 
Polity IV democracy measure.
132
 That democracy indicator is on a 0 to 10 
scale, with scores based on several dimensions of democracy: (1) 
competitiveness of political participation; (2) openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (3) constraints on the chief 
executive.
133
 This measure will specifically capture the democracy/non-
democracy concept since that is precisely what the data addresses. But, as 
noted above, because state ratings also encompass information about the 
strength of the limits on government power to do as it wishes, this variable 
should include some information about the strength and independence of 
the country’s judiciary—although not as expressly as does the rule of the 
law measure. 
I use a state’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of 
economic development to test the hypothesis that more economically-
developed states are more likely than less-developed countries to ratify 
international human rights treaties. GDP per capita is a standard control 
variable in cross-national research used as a proxy for a country’s general 
level of economic development.
134
  
With respect to a state’s level of military exposure, I include a variable 
measuring the state’s military spending. I use a measure of military 
spending as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators which is available for all years in this study.
135
 
Although the human rights data should most directly measure whether the 
 
 
 132. See Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual (Polity 
IV Project 2007), available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See SIMMONS, supra note 66, at 385; Cole, supra note 55; Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 57. 
I obtain the measure from the World Bank World Development Indicators dataset, and I log the 
measure to reduce a skewed distribution. This measure indicates the level of a state’s wealth and is 
correlated with its level of industrialization. This is a time-varying measure that is reported in constant 
U.S. dollars. See Indicators, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.  
 135. I considered the military expenditure data collected by the U.S. State Department, but that 
data was only available until 2005. See World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, http://www. 
state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/index.htm. I also considered using data on interstate military disputes 
from the Correlates of War Dataset, but at the time of drafting, that data was only available up to 2001. 
See CORRELATES OF WAR, Datasets, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Datasets.htm. Thus, I chose to 
use more comprehensive data for this measure of military exposure.  
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state’s citizens are likely to commit the kinds of crimes covered by the 
ICC treaty, this military expenditure data is designed to capture the idea 
that states spending relatively more on their military are also more likely 
to have citizens engaged in military operations thereby potentially 
exposing those citizens to ICC jurisdiction for acts committed during 
peacekeeping or warfare.
136
 
To measure the political costs associated with a state’s domestic 
legislative treaty ratification process, I use data provided by Beth 
Simmons.
137
 That data codes state ratification processes using a four-
category scale, designed to capture the level of difficulty in the formal 
domestic ratification process.
138
  
To test the hypothesis that states following a common law tradition are 
more likely to ratify international human rights treaties than those 
following a civil law tradition, I include data on a state’s legal tradition.139 
I measure this concept using a dichotomous variable indicating whether or 
not a state follows a common law legal tradition.  
Finally, I include a control variable to measure the new democracy, 
forward-looking, ―lock-in‖ theory advanced by Andrew Moravcsik. Using 
the Polity IV democracy measure, I create a dummy variable to account 
for those states that are new democracies. I code new democracies as those 
that became democracies—with a score of 7 or above on the Polity IV 
scale
140—some time during the general negotiation phase of the ICC treaty 
and which have stayed democratic since that time. Because negotiations 
began in 1994, and because it is consistent with Moravcsik’s argument to 
believe that a state would still be a transitional democracy if it only 
 
 
 136. Judith Kelley similarly used a measure of military spending to test the theory that states with 
relatively less military power were less likely to become involved in activities that fall under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, making them more likely to ratify the statute. Kelley, supra note 23, at 579. 
 137. See SIMMONS, supra note 66, at 383.  
 138. The categories are as follows: (1) treaties may be ratified by an individual chief executive or 
cabinet; (1.5) there is a rule or tradition of informing the legislature of signed treaties; (2) treaties may 
only be ratified upon consent of one legislative body; and (3) treaties may only be ratified by a 
supermajority vote in one legislative body or by a majority vote in two separate legislative bodies. The 
source and detailed description of this data are available on Simmons’ website at Mobilizing for 
Human Rights, http://scholar.iq.harvard.edu/bsimmons/mobilizing-for-human-rights. 
 139. The data for this variable were obtained from the Global Development Network Growth 
Database created by William Easterly and Hairong Yu, available at http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20701055~pagePK:64214825~pi
PK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#4.  
 140. Beth Simmons also used 7 as the number above which she considered countries to have 
transitioned to ―democracy‖ in her work testing state commitment to and compliance with various 
international human rights treaties. See SIMMONS, supra note 66, at 385.  
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became a democracy shortly before the creation of the court, I chose 1990 
as the cut-off date for new democracies. 
3. Control Variables: The Normative View 
I also include several control variables in the model to account for the 
theories addressed under the normative view of treaty ratification. First, I 
include a measure to account for the idea that less-developed states may 
ratify treaties so as to appear to embrace the same norms as their more 
powerful and wealthier neighbors, and to receive the concomitant extra-
treaty benefits that may accrue to them as a result. I use net official 
development assistance and official aid (―ODA‖) in constant 2007 U.S. 
dollars as a share of GDP to measure this concept.
141
 ODA consists of the 
loans and grants made to developing countries.  
I measure the concept concerning regional influence by looking at 
regional density of the ratification of the various treaties, articles, and 
optional protocols. Regional density computes ratification by countries in 
the same region up to the previous year. I classify countries by region 
using the seven World Bank categories: Sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Asia/Oceania; Eastern Europe/Central Asia; Latin America/Caribbean; 
Middle East/North Africa; South Asia; and the West (Western Europe, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States).
142
  
Finally, although a precise measure of NGO influence on state 
decisions to commit to the ICC may be impossible, I measure this concept 
using data on the number of NGOs in each state that are members of the 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (the ―CICC‖).143 The CICC 
is a network of over 2,000 NGOs advocating for state membership in a 
fair, effective, and independent ICC).
144
  
 
 
 141. The data are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Simmons used this same 
measure to capture the idea that states might be influenced to ratify human rights treaties because of 
the hope that by doing so they may obtain more access to aid. See id.  
 142. See Countries & Regions, THE WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/0,,pagePK:180619~theSitePK:136917,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2011).  
 143. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011).  
 144. Measuring this concept of NGO influence is difficult in many respects. First, only qualitative 
analysis and case studies may actually produce evidence of whether states were really influenced by 
NGOs to join the ICC. Second, the presence of NGOs in states or even state meetings with NGOs does 
not necessarily mean a state was persuaded by NGOs to change its behavior. In addition, the data I was 
able to obtain on NGO members in the CICC is not as precise as it could be. The data list the number 
of CICC-member NGOs as of March 2009. A more precise measure might account for NGO 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables described above. 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Obs Mean  SD  Min  Max* 
Level of Human Rights 8256 4.979 2.29 0 8 
Genocide or Not 10208 .137 .344 0 1 
Level of Domestic Law 
Enforcement Institutions 
9720 -.065 .999 -2.686 2.116 
Level of Democracy 7928 5.298 3.935 0 10 
Level of Military Expenditure 7376 2.382 2.541 0 39.615 
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty 
Ratification Process 
8956 1.700 .654 1 3 
Level of Economic 
Development 
9324 7.669 1.604 4.191 11.263 
Common Law State or Not 9102 .340 .472 0 1 
Transitioning Democracy or 
Not 
8320 .244 .429 0 1 
Level of Aid or Assistance 9340 .086 .151 -.033 2.119 
Regional Ratification 8504 .307 .291 0 .96 
Level of NGO Presence 10208 13.723 33.585 0 305 
* ―Obs‖ means Observations, ―SD‖ means Standard Deviation, ―Min‖ means Minimum Value, and 
―Max‖ means Maximum Value. 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES TESTING STATE COMMITMENT TO THE ICC 
As an initial matter, examining the ratification patterns of the various 
states provides preliminary support for the credible threat theory and the 
idea that states act retrospectively and consider how their past practices 
predict their ability to comply with treaty terms before committing to a 
treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms. There is strong 
evidence that states with better human rights practices are most likely to 
commit to the ICC, while states with poorer practices are reluctant to 
ratify. Table 3, below, shows that among states with high human rights 
ratings (those states with average physical integrity rights scores of 
between 5 and 8 for the period between 1997 and 2008), some 71% 
ratified the ICC treaty. Among states with worse human rights practices 
(those with average scores of below 5), only about 37% ratified the statute. 
Thus, these results are consistent with the credible threat theory, even 
 
 
membership by state according to particular time-periods. However, I was advised by CICC personnel 
that such data were not maintained in that format. 
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though it does appear that a number of states with poor human rights 
practices have ratified the ICC at this snapshot in time. 
TABLE 3: ICC TREATY RATIFICATION PATTERNS BASED ON 
LIKELIHOOD OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Better Human Rights Practices Worse Human Rights Practices 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Albania, Andorra, 
Antigua, Australia, 
Austria, Barbados, 
Belgium, Belize, 
Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, Comoros, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cyprus,  
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Djibouti, 
Dominica,  
East Timor, 
Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, 
Gabon, Gambia, 
Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guyana, 
Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, 
Lesotho, 
Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Malawi, Malta,  
Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, 
Mongolia, 
Montenegro, 
Namibia, Nauru, 
Netherlands,  
New Zealand, 
Niger, Norway, 
Panama, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, 
Samoa, San 
Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bhutan, Brunei,  
Cape Verde,  
El Salvador, Grenada,  
Guinea-Bissau, 
Jamaica, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, 
Mauritania, 
Micronesia, Moldova, 
Monaco, Nicaragua, 
Oman, Palau, Qatar,  
Sao Tome and 
Principe,  
Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, St. Lucia, 
Swaziland, Taiwan, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates,  
United States, Vanuatu 
 
Algeria, Angola, 
Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, 
Belarus, 
Cameroon, China,  
Cuba, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea,  
Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, 
India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Ivory Coast, 
Kazakhstan, 
Kiribati, Laos, 
Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, 
Morocco, 
Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, 
North Korea, 
Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, 
Philippines, 
Russia, Rwanda,  
Saudi Arabia,  
Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Syria, Thailand, 
Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe 
 
Afghanistan, 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia,  
Central African 
Republic,  
Chad, Colombia, 
Congo,  
Democratic Republic 
of Congo,  
Dominican Republic,  
Ecuador, Georgia, 
Guinea, Jordan, 
Kenya, Liberia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, 
Paraguay, Peru, 
Senegal,  
South Africa, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Venezuela, 
Zambia 
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Better Human Rights Practices Worse Human Rights Practices 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Marino, Serbia,  
Sierra Leone, 
Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia,  
South Korea, Spain,  
St. Kitts & Nevis,  
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, 
Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, 
Trinidad,  
United Kingdom, 
Uruguay  
 
There is also evidence to suggest that the quality of a state’s domestic 
law enforcement institutions influences ICC commitment decisions. 
Looking at a snapshot in time using average rule of law scores, states with 
the best average rule of law scores (above 1), regularly ratified the ICC 
treaty—with an 85% ratification rate. States with the poorest domestic law 
enforcement institutions (those with average rule of law scores below 
-1),
145
 however, were much less likely to ratify. Only approximately 43% 
of these states have ratified the treaty. Table 4 shows the ratification 
patterns of states with the best and worst domestic law enforcement 
institutions. 
 
 
 145. Simmons & Danner, supra note 23, at 246. In their study of ICC commitment, Simmons and 
Danner similarly categorized states with World Bank Rule of Law scores of below -1 as those with the 
―weakest rule of law‖ when testing the robustness of their measure of ―domestic accountability‖—the 
idea that states would hold leaders accountable for any atrocities in violation of the ICC using their 
domestic institutions. Id. 
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TABLE 4: ICC TREATY RATIFICATION PATTERNS BASED ON LEVEL OF 
DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
Best Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Worst Domestic Law Enforcement 
Institutions 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Andorra, 
Australia, Austria, 
Barbados, 
Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, 
Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Japan, 
Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, 
Malta, 
Netherlands,  
New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, 
Switzerland,  
United Kingdom 
Bahamas, 
Singapore, 
Tuvalu,  
United States  
Angola, Belarus, 
Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Iraq, Ivory Coast, 
Laos, Myanmar,  
North Korea, 
Rwanda,  
Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, Sudan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe 
 
Afghanistan, 
Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central 
African Republic,  
Chad, Comoros, 
Congo,  
Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 
Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria,  
Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, 
Venezuela 
 
 
In fact, a further examination of the ratification patterns of only those 
states with poor human rights practices provides additional support for the 
credible threat theory while providing evidence contrary to the explanatory 
power of the credible commitment theory. As Table 5 below shows, 
among states with poor human rights practices, non-democratic states are 
not more likely than democratic states to commit to the ICC. In fact, the 
evidence shows that non-democratic states with poor human rights 
practices are far more likely to avoid the ICC than commit to it. About 
68% of those states did not ratify the Rome Statute. By contrast, among 
democratic states with poor human rights practices (although there are few 
of them), about 54% ratified the treaty. Indeed, comparing the ratification 
patterns of the non-democracies to the democracies shows that 
democracies with poor practices are much more likely than non-
democracies with poor practices to commit to the ICC since about 54% of 
the democracies ratified, whereas only about 32% of the non-democracies 
ratified.  
All of this evidence about the ratification patterns of states with poor 
human rights practices is consistent with the credible threat theory which 
predicts that because the ICC has relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms, states will be retrospective in their calculations and consider 
whether their past and present practices might make commitment unduly 
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costly. Indeed, non-democratic states with poor practices are particularly 
likely to avoid committing to the ICC. This finding is inconsistent with the 
credible commitment theory. The evidence does not suggest that non-
democracies with poor practices are joining the ICC so that they can 
commit to their domestic audiences to better those practices in the future 
because of the external enforcement mechanisms a treaty like the ICC can 
provide.  
Rather, the evidence indicates that states without internal enforcement 
mechanisms and without domestic checks on their power are reluctant to 
commit to the ICC because commitment would entail a costly loss of their 
sovereignty and reduce their power to rule and punish as they wish. 
Democracies with poor practices, on the other hand, have reason to view 
ICC commitment as imposing fewer risks to their sovereignty. Those 
states presumably already have some domestic checks on their power—
perhaps in the form of an independent judiciary that will punish 
perpetrators of mass atrocities, even if those perpetrators happen to be 
government agents or others with whom the government was complicit. 
Thus, although those states still run the risk that their government or 
citizens will commit crimes covered by the ICC treaty, they may believe 
that such crimes would be punished domestically in any event—meaning 
that they would not risk losing the case to The Hague. Indeed, for these 
democratic states with poor practices, ICC commitment may not reduce 
government power. Rather, commitment may potentially increase leaders’ 
power in that the ICC provides a backup forum in which opposition 
powers can be punished should they commit mass atrocities and should 
domestic law enforcement institutions otherwise fail to be effective at 
bringing them to justice.  
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TABLE 5: ICC TREATY RATIFICATION PATTERNS FOR STATES WITH 
POOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES BASED ON WHETHER  
DEMOCRACY OR NOT 
Democracy
146
 Non-Democracy 
Ratify Not Ratify Not Ratify Ratify 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, 
Dominican Republic,  
South Korea, 
Mexico,  
South Africa 
 
Guatemala, 
India, Israel, 
Thailand, 
Philippines, 
Turkey 
Algeria, Angola, 
Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Cameroon, China, 
Cuba, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Haiti, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Ivory 
Coast, Kazakhstan, 
Kiribati, North 
Korea, Laos, 
Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, 
Pakistan,  
Papua New Guinea, 
Russia, Rwanda,  
Saudi Arabia, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Syria, 
Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, 
Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe 
Afghanistan, 
Burundi, Cambodia, 
Central African 
Republic,  
Congo,  
Democratic Republic 
of Congo,  
Ecuador, Georgia, 
Guinea, Jordan, 
Kenya, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Peru, 
Senegal, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, 
Venezuela, Zambia 
 
The event history analysis also provides support for the idea that states 
view the ICC treaty’s enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and 
make retrospective calculations about how their past practices will predict 
their ability to comply with treaty terms so as to avoid committing to 
treaties with strong enforcement mechanisms with which they may not be 
able to comply. Event history analysis factors in the precise timing of state 
decisions to commit to the ICC as it relates to the time-varying and 
constant variables. Table 6 presents results from three multivariate event 
history models testing the rate of becoming party to the ICC treaty. In 
 
 
 146. See SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66. Again, as Beth Simmons 
does in her study, I use 7 as the number above which states were classified as democracies. Id. 
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Model 1, I report the results of the baseline model for ratification which 
includes the main variables of interest: level of human rights practices and 
level of domestic law enforcement institutions. In Model 2, I add the 
control variables that measure other costs of treaty ratification suggested 
by the various rationalist view theories. Finally, Model 3 includes the 
control variables suggested by the normative view theories.
147
 
Most supportive of the credible threat theory—and the idea that states 
engage in retrospective, rather than prospective, calculations in making 
ratification decisions—is the fact that in every model, the variable 
measuring a state’s level of human rights practices is a highly significant 
and positive predictor (at the 1% level) of ICC treaty ratification. States 
with good human rights practices are quite likely to join the ICC. With 
each unit increase in a state’s human right rating, a state becomes between 
30% and 38% more likely to commit (see the hazard ratio of 1.307 in 
Model 1 and hazard ratio of 1.380 in Model 3).
148
 The other compliance 
costs predictors on which this theory particularly rests—past genocide and 
the level of a state’s domestic law enforcement institutions—are not 
significant in any of the models. This suggests that states may not factor in 
their past genocides specifically or their ability to domestically prosecute 
any violations of the Rome Statute when making ICC commitment 
decisions.  
Rather, the evidence indicates that, in terms of precise compliance 
costs, states may be most concerned with their general level of human 
rights practices. If a state’s practices and policies are such that its 
government or citizens should not commit mass atrocities, then whatever 
its capacity to prosecute such atrocities domestically, it can still calculate 
that committing to the ICC will carry few or no costs related to 
 
 
 147. I used the exact method for ties because the data contains tied event times where states ratify 
in the same quarter.  
 148. Judith Kelley similarly found that a state’s human rights ratings were a positive and 
significant predictor of ICC ratification. However, Kelley’s focus of inquiry was on state decisions to 
sign bilateral immunity agreements, and her ratification model used logistic regression (which is 
arguably less precise than the event history model which takes timing of ratification into consideration 
and which includes time-varying covariates). Furthermore, her test of ratification behavior was only 
preliminary to that primary inquiry and included very few independent variables. See Kelley, supra 
note 23, at 578–80. By contrast, Goodliffe and Hawkins found little evidence that a state’s human 
rights practices predicted whether the state supported a strong and independent ICC based on 
statements made during Rome Statute negotiations. Of course, that study did not look at state 
ratification decisions, but instead quantified state positions regarding the court and commitment to it 
by coding statements state representatives made during various negotiations of the Rome Statute. 
Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 23. As noted above in note 129, Simmons included no measure for 
the level of a state’s human rights practices other than whether the state experienced a recent civil war. 
SIMMONS, supra note 66, at 103. 
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noncompliance.
149
 By contrast, where the state’s practices and policies are 
such that it might expect its government or citizens to commit mass 
atrocities, it may still conclude that commitment is unduly costly even 
though it may believe it has domestic law enforcement institutions that are 
sufficiently independent and capable of prosecuting any such atrocities. As 
discussed above, because the ICC prosecutor and court are empowered to 
determine whether the state is ―willing‖ or ―able‖ to prosecute mass 
atrocities domestically, most states with poor practices may conclude that 
the complementarity provision does not give them enough protection 
against a costly loss of their sovereign right to mete out justice within their 
own borders. 
On the other hand, the democracy variable is a positive and significant 
predictor of ICC ratification in both models in which it was included. With 
each unit increase in its democracy rating, a state is between 10% and 16% 
more likely to commit to the ICC (see the hazard ratio of 1.105 in Model 2 
and hazard ratio of 1.163 in Model 3). Even though democracy is not a 
primary indicator of potential compliance with the precise terms of the 
treaty, democracies more than autocracies tend to have the kinds of 
policies, laws, practices, and institutions, that favor protecting human 
rights.
150
 Thus, the consistent significance of the democracy variable also 
adds some support to the credible threat theory and the idea that states 
with lower noncompliance costs will more readily commit to treaties like 
the ICC with stronger enforcement mechanisms.  
In addition, the positive significance of the democracy variable may 
provide some support for the idea that the complementarity provision and 
the ability of the state’s law enforcement institutions to conduct 
independent and capable investigations and prosecutions plays a role in 
the ICC ratification behavior of some states. One of the democracy 
variable’s components measures constraints on the chief executive, which 
should include things like checks and balances limiting state power and 
the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, it may be that where power 
is not concentrated and where the state already has limits on its power to 
do as it pleases, it will conclude that commitment to the ICC will not entail 
a significant loss of sovereignty. By contrast, and contrary to the 
 
 
 149. As a robustness check, I ran the models using data from the Political Terror Scale 1976–2008 
instead of the human rights measure based on data from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights 
Dataset. See Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 125. The results still support the credible threat 
theory. In each of the models a state’s level of human rights was a significant and positive predictor of 
ratification at the 5% level. In each instance, however, there were fewer observations and between ten 
and twenty-seven fewer countries included in the models.  
 150. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 55, at 475.  
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predictions of the credible commitment theory, where the state is an 
autocracy and has no domestic limits on its power, it will conclude that 
ICC commitment will entail a costly loss of sovereignty and a reduction in 
its own powers. And, as shown in Table 5, there is support for the idea that 
even among states with poor human rights practices, those that are more 
likely to commit to the ICC are those that are also democracies, which —
already operate with constraints on their power.  
Indeed, the results of this event history analysis not only provide 
compelling support for the credible threat theory, but they also provide 
evidence discrediting the explanatory power of the credible commitment 
theory advanced by Simmons and Danner. The evidence suggests that 
states guard their sovereignty and calculate treaty commitment costs by 
looking at their past practices in an effort to determine their ability to 
comply with treaty terms before committing to an international human 
rights treaty with relatively strong enforcement mechanisms that can be 
used to hold them accountable. The evidence shows that states with good 
human rights practices and democratic states are more likely to join the 
ICC. States with poor human rights practices and states that are non-
democratic are less likely to commit to the court. Thus, at least where 
enforcement mechanisms are strong, there is no evidence to suggest that 
states abandon sovereignty concerns (or determine that they are 
outweighed) and commit to an international human rights treaty that can 
hold them accountable where they have otherwise decided not to impose 
upon themselves any domestic accountability mechanisms. Certainly, as 
noted above, some states with poor practices have committed to the court, 
but the empirical evidence does not demonstrate an overwhelming trend 
towards commitment without an ability to comply with treaty terms.  
TABLE 6: COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODELS EXPLAINING 
RATIFICATION OF THE ICC TREATY 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Level of Human Rights Practices 
(Physical Integrity) 
1.307*** 
p=0.000 
1.323*** 
p=0.004 
1.380*** 
p=0.003 
Past Genocide or Not .651 
p=0.333 
.375 
p=0.107 
.385 
p=0.129 
Quality of Domestic Law Enforcement 
(ROL World Bank) 
1.249 
p=0.104 
1.428 
p=0.256 
1.453 
p=0.266 
Level of Democracy  -- 1.105** 
p=0.053 
1.163** 
p=0.021 
Level of Military Expenditure -- .789** 
p=0.031 
.837 
p=0.125 
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Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty 
Ratification Process 
-- 1.382 
p=0.148 
1.391 
p=0.200 
Level of Economic Development -- .867 
p=0.380 
.641 
p=0.073 
Common Law State or Not -- .935 
p=0.837 
.758 
p=0.468 
Transitioning Democracy or Not -- -- .553 
p=0.123 
Level of Aid or Assistance  -- .013 
p=0.097 
Regional Ratification -- -- 4.353 
p=0.103 
Level of NGO Presence -- -- .997 
p=0.511 
# of Countries 184 126 123 
# of Ratifications 91 65 62 
# of Observations 4245 2860 2827 
**, ***= 5%, 1% significance 
The significant and negative effect of a state’s level of military 
expenditure on ratification in Model 2 lends some additional support to the 
credible threat theory. States with greater military expenditures were less 
likely than states with lower expenditures to commit to the ICC, 
suggesting that states with more military exposure view noncompliance 
with the ICC treaty as more costly than states with less exposure. Of 
course, because the United States and China have not joined the court, and 
because both have large military budgets, caution may be warranted in 
interpreting these particular results. 
Arguably, a state’s level of economic development could also influence 
its ability to comply with a human rights treaty. This is particularly true if 
we assume that economically developed countries are also those that are 
more likely to embrace progress and post materialist values, such as the 
need to protect citizens against human rights abuses.
151
 However, the 
economic development variable was not a significant and positive 
predictor of ICC commitment in either of the models in which it was 
included. On the other hand, the indicator for that variable is highly 
 
 
 151. See generally RONALD INGLEHART, SILENT REVOLUTION: CHANGING VALUES AND 
POLITICAL STYLES AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS (1977); RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN 
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990). 
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correlated with the indicator for the state’s level of domestic law 
enforcement institutions which may mean that the two variables are 
overlapping in capturing effects. To ensure that the models were not being 
compromised as a result of these high correlations, I ran Models 2 and 3 
without the indicator for economic development (the variable that had 
only been included as a control). In each case, the results for the remaining 
variables did not differ substantially from the results of the models which 
included the economic development measure.  
As to the other theories for which control variables were added in the 
models, they were not supported by the event history analysis. First, where 
ICC ratification is concerned, it appears that other costs such as domestic 
ratification difficulties or uncertainty costs based on a country’s legal 
traditions are less of a concern than the actual ability of the state to comply 
with treaty terms. Specifically, in neither of Models 2 and 3 were the 
variables measuring the difficulty of a state’s domestic ratification 
processes or whether it followed a common law or civil legal tradition 
significant predictors of state commitment to the ICC treaty. Nor was there 
any support for the idea that governments in the process of a democratic 
transition ignore (or discount) compliance costs and the credible threat 
associated with committing to treaties with relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms. The notion that a state in transition might try to lock-in those 
democratic practices for future governments was not borne out. Instead, 
the event history analysis provides support for the credible threat theory 
and the idea that states are more rational and look retrospectively to their 
past practices in making calculations about the likely consequences of 
treaty commitment, particularly where, as in the case of the ICC, the 
treaty’s enforcement mechanisms are relatively strong.  
Furthermore, the quantitative evidence does not suggest that state 
decisions to commit to the ICC are significantly driven by normative 
concerns. None of the variables included to test normative theories was a 
positive and significant predictor of ICC ratification. Yet, importantly, the 
addition of all of these control variables to account for other theories did 
not alter the significance of the human rights variable, thus lending 
additional support for the credible threat theory.
152
 
 
 
 152. Substituting different measures of military exposure and domestic law enforcement 
institutions in the final model also did not alter the significance of the human rights variable. Indeed, it 
remained a significant and positive predictor of ICC ratification at the 1% level. For the military 
exposure concept, I used various measures obtained from the U.S. State Department data which is 
reported up to 2005: (1) military expenditure in constant U.S. dollars; (2) military expenditure per 
capita: and (3) armed forces in thousands. I used the Political Risk Services Group International 
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In sum, both the positive and null results are consistent with the 
credible threat theory. The results suggest that where an international 
human rights treaty contains legally binding enforcement mechanisms 
backed by resources to punish noncompliant behavior, states are motivated 
by rationalist concerns and calculate the costs of treaty commitment by 
looking retrospectively at the evidence which might influence their ability 
to comply with treaty terms. Where treaties contain weak enforcement 
mechanisms, even a rational state may commit without intending to or 
being able to comply if it can envision other benefits—such as increased 
trade—that may flow from commitment. But, with weak enforcement 
mechanisms, the costs of noncompliance may be easily outweighed by 
such potential benefits. Where treaty mechanisms are stronger, the 
calculation is different. The quantitative evidence suggests that on the 
whole, states making commitment calculations in such circumstances are 
concerned with the consequences of failing to comply with treaty terms.  
CONCLUSION 
What explains the puzzle of state commitment to the ICC? Why would 
states commit to an international human rights treaty with relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms even though states typically guard their 
sovereignty? Can we expect that the more than 100 states that have ratified 
the ICC treaty will abide by treaty terms and protect against human rights 
abuses and/or domestically prosecute any of their citizens who commit 
mass atrocities? Can we further expect that these more than 100 states are 
committed to the goal of ending impunity for perpetrators of mass 
atrocities? On the other hand, why did some ninety states fail to ratify the 
ICC treaty or do so more slowly than others? Given the ICC treaty’s 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms, can we expect that states with 
the worst human rights practices and worst domestic law enforcement 
institutions are among the states that have not ratified? If the majority of 
states joining the court are also those that already have the best human 
rights practices, can the ICC really have a significant impact on improving 
universal respect for human rights and deterring mass atrocities?  
These are the questions that were posed in the introduction and to 
which I suggest this study has provided some answers. The results of the 
empirical analyses offer evidence that states tend to view the ICC’s 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and are 
 
 
Country Risk Guide Law and Order measure (on a scale of 1 to 6 and for 161 countries) as a substitute 
for the World Bank Rule of Law measure (which dataset includes more than 200 countries).  
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more likely to commit to the court when their retrospective calculations 
about their ability to comply with treaty terms show that commitment will 
pose little threat to their sovereignty. States with good human rights 
records are more likely to ratify the ICC treaty than are states with poor 
human rights records. The results are consistent with the interpretation of 
the ICC offered in this Article: that its enforcement mechanisms—in the 
form of an independent prosecutor and court that can usurp state 
sovereignty and investigate and punish those who commit offenses 
prohibited by the treaty’s terms—are strong, such that states view them as 
a credible threat. This finding regarding ICC commitment is in stark 
contrast to other published findings for international human rights treaties 
with the weakest enforcement mechanisms.
153
 Indeed, only very recently, 
Christine Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui found that states with poor human 
rights practices were actually more likely to ratify international human 
rights treaties, but all of the treaties included in their study only require 
states to self-report their compliance.
154
 
On the other hand, the evidence does not support the power of the 
credible commitment theory or normative theories to generally explain 
state decisions to join the ICC. For the most part, states are not committing 
to the ICC treaty even though they cannot comply with its terms so as to 
demonstrate any future promise to change their ways and commit to 
ending violence and impunity in the future. Indeed, it makes sense that 
leaders of non-democracies with poor human rights practices would be 
concerned about the credible threat posed by committing to an institution 
like the ICC with which they may not be able to comply and which they 
cannot control. After all, these same states generally have not implemented 
domestic accountability mechanisms, suggesting that they may not want to 
be bound by international mechanisms that could hold them accountable 
either. Nor does the evidence show that states as a rule are committing to 
the ICC despite their ability to comply because of normative pressures.  
Rather, the evidence suggests that in the case of ICC commitment, 
states are concerned about the costs of compliance and the relative 
strength of the ICC treaty’s enforcement mechanisms and thus engage in 
retrospective calculations about their likelihood of compliance prior to 
 
 
 153. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 55, at 483–84 (noting the insignificance of the variable measuring 
the influence of human rights ratings on ratification of the ICCPR and ICPSCR).  
 154. See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 57, at 744–47 (noting that results of event history 
analyses testing state ratification of seven international human rights treaties—all of which contained 
only reporting enforcement mechanisms—showed that rights-violating governments were more likely 
to ratify those treaties in a given year, all else being equal).  
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commitment. But, if the states that are committing to the ICC are primarily 
states with good human rights records, can strong enforcement 
mechanisms play the role that they are intended to play: namely, 
improving respect for human rights and punishing those who fail to 
respect individual human rights? After all, if the states with the worst 
practices are not joining the court, can the ICC treaty actually accomplish 
its goal of deterring mass atrocities and ensuring that the perpetrators of 
mass atrocities are brought to justice?  
Although no unequivocal answer to these questions is possible, there is 
evidence which provides hope that the ICC can make a difference even as 
to those states with the worst human rights practices. First, there is some 
evidence suggesting that the ICC’s complementarity provision may play a 
positive role in prompting at least the more democratic states among those 
with poor human rights practices to commit to the court. According to the 
results of the quantitative analyses, a state’s level of democracy is a 
significant and positive predictor of ICC treaty ratification. In addition, 
Table 5 shows that amongst states with poor human rights practices, the 
more democratic states are more likely to join the ICC. Therefore, it may 
be that even though a state has poor practices, where it is more democratic 
and already has checks and balances on its domestic power—such as 
through an independent judiciary—it may still conclude that commitment 
to the ICC does not impose significant sovereignty costs. The government 
may assume that it will be punished domestically anyway should it 
commit human rights abuses, and because the ICC treaty’s 
complementarity provision allows the state to avoid an ICC prosecution if 
it prosecutes human rights abuses domestically, the government could 
rationally conclude that commitment would not reduce its power.  
Indeed, for states with poor human rights practices that are more 
democratic and have checks and balances on their domestic powers, ICC 
commitment may in some cases prove beneficial in increasing government 
power. Even though the state may have judicial or other mechanisms to 
hold opposition powers accountable should they commit human rights 
abuses, the ICC can provide an additional fall-back mechanism by which 
to hold those powers accountable should domestic institutions fail for 
some reason. On the other hand, as one might expect of non-democracies 
where leaders enjoy concentrated power, non-democracies with poor 
practices will view ICC commitment as a costly check on their power to 
rule and punish as they please domestically. What this implies for the 
future of international organizations is that they are more likely to be 
successful in getting nations to risk some costly commitments and a 
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potential loss of sovereignty where power within the nation is not 
concentrated.  
As such, at least in some cases, we may see that states with poor human 
rights records that are more democratic will conclude that commitment to 
the ICC is not overly costly because the leaders of those states already 
have domestic constraints on their power. Should such states commit to 
the ICC, because the treaty creating the court has relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms, both the current leaders, any opposition powers, 
and any future leaders will have to comply with treaty provisions. If the 
state or its citizens commits mass atrocities, and if the state is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute those crimes domestically, then the state will have to 
suffer the costly consequences.  
Second, even if states with poor practices are not prompted to join the 
ICC because they already have domestic checks and balances on 
government power, as Tables 3, 4, and 5 show, a number of states with 
bad human rights practices and weak domestic law enforcement 
institutions have joined the court. They have done so notwithstanding that 
the credible threat theory predicts that states with bad human rights 
practices would rationally avoid the potentially costly commitment to the 
ICC. But, because the ICC treaty’s terms include relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms, states with poor practices and poor institutions 
will have to improve their potential for compliance with ICC treaty terms 
unless they want to be the subject of the ICC’s next investigation.  
This conclusion that the ICC treaty’s strong enforcement mechanisms 
can produce good results even in states with poor human rights practices is 
supported by a brief review of events concerning Kenya and the ICC. 
Kenya committed to the ICC in 2005 despite the fact that it had poor 
human rights ratings.
155
 But, in 2009, it became the subject of an ICC 
investigation based on violence that occurred at the instigation of various 
government leaders in the aftermath of the country’s 2007 presidential 
elections.
156
 Although Kenya was given the opportunity to prosecute those 
instigators domestically, because it did not do so, in December 2010, the 
 
 
 155. Kenya has scored between 1 and 4 on the Cingranelli-Richards human rights scale (with 8 
representing the best human rights practices) between 1998 and 2008.  
 156. Media Advisory, CICC, ICC Opens Kenya Investigation (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=3866; Press Release, ICC, ICC Judges Grant the 
Prosecutor’s Request to Launch an Investigation on Crimes Against Humanity with Regard to the 
Situation in Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and% 
20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/press%20releases/icc%20judges%20grant%20the%20pro
secutor%E2%80%99s%20request%20to%20launch%20an%20investigation%20on%20crimes%20aga
inst%20humanity%20with.  
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ICC prosecutor announced that he would be proceeding with a case 
against six suspects involved in that post-election violence.
157
 Thus, even 
though ICC commitment did not cause Kenya to improve its practices, 
there is still good news as it relates to the power of strong enforcement 
mechanisms to aid in realizing treaty goals—in this case, the goal of 
ending impunity for those who abuse individual human rights. It appears 
that at least six suspects who participated in Kenya’s 2007 post-election 
violence will be required to answer for their conduct in The Hague before 
the ICC court. 
Third, the ICC’s jurisdictional grant allows it to investigate and 
prosecute in some circumstances even where the atrocities have not been 
committed by a citizen of a State Party to the court. Sudan is not a party to 
the court, but because the Security Council referred that matter to the ICC, 
President Bashir has become the subject of an ICC arrest warrant. And, 
although he has not yet been arrested, the fact of the arrest warrant has 
most certainly curtailed his activities. Only recently, the Security Council 
also referred to the ICC ―the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011, 
while recognizing that the country is not party to the Rome Statute that 
created the Court.‖158 In the resolution referring the matter, the Council 
stated it considered the ―’widespread and systematic attacks currently 
taking place in the Libya Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population 
may amount to crimes against humanity.’‖159 The fact of the referral 
overall is a positive sign that the ICC and its relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms will play a role in deterring mass atrocities and ending 
impunity for those who commit them. As one commentator noted, by 
virtue of the referral to the ICC, those who instruct or carry out 
instructions to bomb or otherwise use violence against the civil population 
in Libya now know that they will potentially be subject to international 
justice.
160
 
In conclusion, what this study shows is that where enforcement 
mechanisms are stronger, states take their commitment to international 
 
 
 157. Steve Inskeep, ICC Case Accuses 6 Prominent Kenyans of Violence, NPR.ORG, Dec. 16, 
2010, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/16/132101160/ICC-Case-Accuses-6-Kenyan-Leaders-Of-Violence; 
Collins Mbalo, Kenya: ICC Prosecutor Names 2008 Post Election Violence Suspects, GLOBAL 
VOICES, Dec. 16, 2010, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/12/16/icc-prosecutor-names-6-2008-post-
election-violence-suspects-in-kenya/.  
 158. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities 
in Bid to Stem Violent Repression (Feb. 26, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. 
asp?NewsID=37633&C. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Edith M. Lederer, US Supports War Crimes Tribunal for First Time, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 2, 2011.  
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human rights treaties seriously. Therefore, it may be that states are not 
committing to the ICC unless they intend to comply, the implication being 
that treaties with significant enforcement mechanisms may be more 
effective at curbing human rights abuses. Presumably this focus by states 
on the potential for compliance with treaty terms is a positive sign since 
the point of international human rights treaties is to actually promote better 
human rights practices. Of course, the ICC treaty can only deal with a 
small portion of human rights abuses. The court will only adjudicate 
crimes that amount to mass atrocities committed by the highest-level 
offenders. If we hope to improve states’ domestic human rights practices 
using international human rights treaties, we should structure those treaties 
with ―hard law‖ enforcement provisions that are clear, precise, binding, 
and backed by resources to coerce compliance and punish noncompliance. 
Otherwise, without the threat of punishment via strong enforcement 
mechanisms, states may commit as window dressing only and without an 
actual intention to further the goals of the treaty or abide by its terms. And 
states appear to be doing just that inasmuch as studies have found that 
states frequently join international human rights treaties, but thereafter 
continue to abuse human rights.
161
  
Some may argue that ramping up the enforcement mechanisms could 
create a situation where only those states predisposed to ratify and with 
good human rights practices will actually commit to human rights treaties. I 
contend, however, that this potential issue is not a reason to proceed with a 
regime that is essentially toothless. First, we know from the examination of 
ICC ratification patterns that even some states with poor human rights 
records will ratify treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms.
162
 An 
admittedly optimistic interpretation of this fact is that states with poor 
human rights records ratify treaties like the ICC with stronger enforcement 
mechanisms because the norm cascade has reached them, and they want to 
improve their practices and hold themselves accountable. Of course, states 
with poor records may also ratify the ICC treaty not because they 
necessarily want to do what is appropriate, but because they are enticed into 
doing so for reasons unrelated to their practices. Such motives may include 
the desire to appear legitimate and/or the hope of receiving extra-treaty 
 
 
 161. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?, supra note 20, at 1981 (concluding that based upon an examination of state 
commitment to seventeen different human rights treaties—most of which had weak enforcement 
mechanisms—countries with poor human rights practices were often more likely to ratify those with 
better practices). 
 162. See supra Table 3. 
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benefits by appearing to embrace widely-held human rights norms. States 
with particularly calculating governments may even commit to the ICC for 
political reasons and to use the threat of an ICC prosecution against their 
political opponents who use violence. Even if these reasons motivate 
ratification, however, with strong enforcement mechanisms, such states 
could be forced into improving their practices. This is the ultimate goal of 
human rights treaties. Future research
163
 should help us determine whether 
the ICC’s enforcement mechanisms are actually promoting better human 
rights practices.  
If the credible threat theory is correct, as I argue, and if the enforcement 
mechanisms in the ICC treaty are as strong as they appear to be on paper, 
states that have committed to the ICC—particularly those with poor 
practices—should be improving their ability to comply with treaty terms. 
Otherwise, states with poor practices, in particular, face a substantial risk to 
their sovereignty. Even states that ratified because their practices and 
institutions were already good may also seek to improve their ability to 
comply with treaty terms. After all, the ICC covers war crimes. States with 
otherwise stellar human rights ratings may worry that in times of conflict, 
one or more of their citizens may commit an act that constitutes a crime 
under the ICC treaty. Those states may change their military codes or 
military training practices so that their militaries are forced to comply with 
the treaty’s terms. Furthermore, as to the second prong of ICC compliance, 
a state can avoid a loss of sovereignty if it prosecutes any covered crimes 
domestically. Therefore, the fact of ICC commitment may induce states to 
increase their domestic prosecutions of mass atrocities and other human 
rights violations. 
Of course, even with the credible threat of strong enforcement 
mechanisms, states simply may not have the ability to improve their 
practices without outside help. In many cases, NGOs might be able to 
provide that support. The CICC, for example, provides some resources and 
advice to states still needing to implement into their domestic legislation all 
of the crimes covered the Rome Statute (so that such crimes theoretically 
can be prosecuted domestically).
164
 William Burke-White argues that the 
ICC should have the power and ability to engage in a policy of ―proactive 
complementarity,‖ whereby the court can help states with the training and 
 
 
 163. Qualitative case studies should be particularly helpful in determining whether states with 
poor human rights practices have improved those practices—by enacting laws, for example, or by 
improving their domestic capacity to try those who abuse human rights.  
 164. See Implementation of the Rome Statute, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=romeimplementation (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
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resources to actually prosecute mass atrocities domestically.
165
 States and 
other policy makers should consider assisting further in these and other 
ways so that states currently without the ability to comply with the Rome 
Statute are able to at least able to take steps towards compliance. States 
may more readily commit to human rights treaties with strong enforcement 
mechanisms if they know they will receive assistance in their efforts to 
comply.  
This study provides evidence that states view strong enforcement 
mechanisms in international human rights treaties as a credible threat, 
causing them to care about their ability to comply with those treaties when 
making commitment decisions. There seems little point of a regime that 
encourages states to commit to treaties with which they have no intention 
of complying. ―Hard law‖ in the form of legally binding enforcement 
mechanisms can encourage states to commit to treaties with which they 
intend to comply. 
APPENDIX A 
STATES PARTIES TO THE ICC TREATY AND RATIFICATION DATES  
(AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2008)  
State Date State Date State Date State Date 
Afghanistan 2/10/2003 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
4/11/2002 Liechtenstein 10/2/2001 Senegal 2/2/1999 
Albania 1/31/2003 Denmark 6/21/2001 Lithuania 5/12/2003 Serbia 9/6/2001 
Andorra 4/30/2001 Djibouti 11/5/2002 Luxembourg 9/8/2000 Sierra Leone 9/15/2001 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
6/18/2001 Dominica 2/12/2001 Macedonia 3/6/2002 Slovakia 4/11/2002 
Argentina 2/8/2001 
Dominican 
Republic 
5/12/2005 Madagascar 3/14/2008 Slovenia 12/31/2001 
Australia 7/1/2002 Ecuador 2/5/2002 Malawi 9/19/2002 South Africa 11/27/2000 
Austria 12/28/2000 Estonia 1/30/2002 Mali 8/16/2000 Spain 10/24/2000 
Barbados 12/10/2002 Fiji 11/29/1999 Malta 11/29/2002 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
8/22/2006 
Belgium 6/28/2000 Finland 12/29/2000 Marshall Islands 12/7/2000 St. Vincent  12/3/2002 
Belize 4/5/2000 France 6/9/2000 Mauritius 3/5/2002 Suriname 7/15/2008 
Benin 1/22/2002 Gabon 9/20/2000 Mexico 11/28/2005 Sweden 6/28/2001 
Bolivia 6/27/2002 Gambia 6/28/2002 Mongolia 4/11/2002 Switzerland 11/12/2001 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
4/11/2002 Georgia 9/5/2003 Montenegro 11/23/2006 Tajikistan 5/5/2000 
Botswana 9/8/2000 Germany 12/11/2000 Namibia 6/25/2002 Tanzania 8/20/2002 
Brazil 6/20/2002 Ghana 12/20/1999 Nauru 11/12/2001 Timor Leste 9/6/2002 
Bulgaria 4/11/2002 Greece 5/15/2002 Netherlands 7/17/2001 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
4/6/1999 
Burkina Faso 4/16/2004 Guinea 7/14/2003 New Zealand 9/7/2000 Uganda 6/14/2002 
Burundi 9/21/2004 Guyana 9/24/2004 Niger 4/11/2002 
United 
Kingdom 
10/4/2001 
Cambodia 4/11/2002 Honduras 7/1/2002 Nigeria 9/27/2001 Uruguay 6/28/2002 
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Canada 7/7/2000 Hungary 11/30/2001 Norway 2/16/2000 Venezuela 6/7/2000 
Central African 
Republic 
10/3/2001 Iceland 5/25/2000 Panama 3/21/2002 Zambia 11/13/2002 
Chad 11/1/2006 Ireland 4/11/2002 Paraguay 5/14/2001   
Colombia 8/5/2002 Italy 7/26/1999 Peru 11/10/2001   
Comoros 8/18/2006 Japan 7/17/2007 Poland 11/12/2001   
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
5/3/2004 Jordan 4/11/2002 Portugal 2/5/2002   
Cook Islands 7/18/2008 Kenya 3/15/2005 South Korea 11/13/2002   
Costa Rica 6/7/2001 Latvia 6/28/2002 Romania 4/11/2002   
Croatia 5/21/2001 Lesotho 9/6/2000 Samoa 9/16/2002   
Cyprus 3/7/2002 Liberia 9/22/2004 San Marino 5/13/1999   
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